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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
 
Bilateral trade negotiations between the European Union and MERCOSUR 
(Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay) began in 1995. After an initial phase of 
dialogue at the political level, in 2001 the two blocks commenced negotiations on the 
goods and services to be included in the trade liberalisation process. In this 
framework, a first list of sensitive products was drawn up, and agricultural products 
feature heavily on this list. 
 
In this context, in order to understand the two blocs’ negotiating positions it is 
vitally important to have a comparative analysis of their respective agricultural 
policies, since these policies are based on each side’s agricultural policy objectives 
and the kinds of instruments used to pursue these objectives.  
 
In this report we review different studies of the subject and undertake an 
analysis from two specific angles: (i) first, we cover agricultural policy in all its 
dimensions, with detailed consideration of trade aspects (market access and measures 
relating to exports), and with particular emphasis on internal policies to support 
agriculture; and second, we approach this question from the perspective of EU-
MERCOSUR bilateral free trade negotiations so as to identify the policy measures 
most relevant to the negotiations. Our analysis in this study is based on information 
gathered by IICA, ECLAC and CIRAD, and also REDPA’s2 contributions, which 
have been systematized in a database developed at ECLAC. 
 
The context of EU-MERCOSUR trade relations 
 
In order to carry out this comparative analysis of policies, some of the outstanding 
characteristics of the relations between the two blocs must be taken into account: 
 
• In the economic field the two regions are clearly asymmetrical. EU-25 has a 
total population of just under double that of the extended MERCOSUR, and 
generates 9.3 times the GDP and seven times more exports than the southern 
bloc. These figures go a long way towards explaining why EU-25’s per 
capita GDP is more than five times greater than that of the extended 
MERCOSUR. 
 
• This asymmetry, however, has not impeded the development of strong links 
between the two blocs. First, Europe is a major foreign investor in the 
extended MERCOSUR, particularly in Brazil and Bolivia, and in Chile, 
where EU investment accounts for more than one third of total foreign 
investment. Thus an association agreement between the two regions would 
not only improve conditions for European investors by providing greater 
legal security, it would also directly foster increased trade flows between 
MERCOSUR and the EU nations and give rise to increased profits for 
European firms located in MERCOSUR countries. Second, MERCOSUR’s 
                                                 
2  REDPA, the Regional Network for the Coordination of Agricultural Policies, is made up of the Agricultural 
Policy Directorates of the six countries in the extended MERCOSUR which are members of CAS. 
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agricultural exports account for more than 20% of Europe’s total agricultural 
imports and generate a global trade balance very much in MERCOSUR’s 
favour. Due to the fact that agricultural products loom so large in the 
bilateral relationship it is vital that they be adequately considered in the 
negotiations as otherwise MERCOSUR’s trade balance may become 
negative in a framework of trade liberalisation, and thus the partner that is 
less developed economically would be negatively affected.  
 
• It should be noted that, although EU-MERCOSUR trade links are strong at 
the present time, there is no preferential trade treatment between the two 
blocs with the exception of the Generalised System of Tariff Preferences 
(GSP) that is applied by the EU to the MERCOSUR countries, the GSP Plus 
applied in the case of Bolivia, and the mutual preferences established in the 
Economic Association Agreement between Chile and the EU. 
 
 
Differences between the two blocs’ agricultural policy objectives 
 
The objectives of the EU and MERCOSUR agricultural policies can be clearly 
differentiated. 
 
           Although it is true that the goals of the EU’s common agricultural policy have 
evolved over the last fifty years, a basic structural principle in community policy is 
still to defend European agriculture. In Europe, the initial objective was to increase 
production and productivity to cope with the food deficit in the 1950s and 60s, but 
this has gradually been replaced by multiple objectives such as adapting production to 
market needs, bringing agricultural policy instruments into line with World Trade 
Organization (WTO) requirements, environmental protection, land organization and 
ensuring the sanitary quality and safety of foodstuffs. 
 
            In MERCOSUR, over the last two or three decades, the countries’ agricultural 
policies have focused on improving competitiveness so as to be able to enter 
international markets. These countries evolved very well with regard to the objectives 
of the 1970s and 80s when the state sector played a predominant and even 
overbearing role, and public entities were involved in storage, marketing, credit and 
providing subsidised services. In the mid and late 1980s the focus of agricultural and 
trade policies changed, there was widespread deregulation in the MERCOSUR 
economies, countries’ markets were liberalised and import tariffs were drastically cut. 
All this meant a loss of protection for domestic markets. In recent years the trend has 
been to open up economies and insert into international markets, and this has 
increasingly involved policies to support the incorporation of small rural agricultural 
units into commercial chains, policies of rural development to support marginal and 
small farmers, and policies to combat rural poverty. 
 
Differences between the two blocs’ agricultural trade policies 
 
As noted above, the Southern Cone countries have liberalised their economies and 
drastically decreased their levels of support for agriculture, while the EU policy, in 
total contrast, has been to promote generalised measures to support agriculture. This is 
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reflected in policy instruments in the sphere of entry into markets, support for exports 
and internal support for the agricultural sector. 
 
Access to markets 
 
EU policies on access to markets differ from the MERCOSUR approach in that the 
Europeans make use of all available instruments for protection (tariff peaks, tariff 
escalation and tariff rate quotas (TRQ). 
 
• The average tariff applied by the European Union on agricultural produce is 
almost double that applied by the extended MERCOSUR. While the EU 
applies an average tariff of 20.2% on agricultural produce from MERCOSUR 
(with the exception of Bolivia (12.2%) and Chile (16.0%), the MERCOSUR 
countries apply an average tariff of 12% on European agricultural produce 
(less in the cases of Bolivia (10%) due to GSP Plus, and also in the case of 
Chile (under 6%) due to its bilateral agreement with the EU). 
 
• Even though European Union average tariffs are quite moderate, there are 
very high tariff peaks for some specific agricultural products that are 
considered sensitive by European producers. One example of this is sugar, for 
which the maximum tariff-rate quota applied in 2005 reached 245%, while 
certain meat products were taxed at 275%, flour at 222% and certain dairy 
products at 313%. In general, the MERCOSUR member countries do not 
apply these levels of tariff peaks to restrict trade. There are some relatively 
modest cases that do not exceed 22%, like some instances in the sugar and 
confectionary chapters (35% Paraguay), beverages (21.5%), tobacco (21.5%) 
and price bands that are in use in Chile.  
 
• The European Union applies a broad system of tariff quotas. The chapters 
with the greatest number of tariff-rate quotas are meat, cereals, dairy products 
and sugar. For MERCOSUR agricultural products, contingency tariffs are a 
key instrument to gain access to the European market because the main South 
American agricultural exports are subject to tariff quotas when entering the 
EU market, and the level of this tariff quota protection is one of the most 
delicate points in the bilateral trade negotiations between the two blocs. It 
should be noted that tariff quotas are assigned to individual MERCOSUR 
countries and cannot be transferred from one country to another. 
 
• The matter of European tariff quota protection measures applied to 
MERCOSUR agricultural produce is complex because it is closely linked to 
multilateral negotiations conducted under the umbrella of the WTO. It is 
necessary to distinguish between European tariff quotas specific to 
MERCOSUR and erga omnes tariff quotas that apply to all countries and for 
which MERCOSUR countries must compete with other WTO members. 
 
Measures related to exports 
 
The European Union has been exercising its right, which has been affirmed at the 
WTO, to subsidise exports by means of a mechanism called ‘export refunds’, whereby 
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any European exporter receives a subsidy to compensate for the gap between the 
European price and the price prevailing on the world market. 
 
            These export refunds, which amounted to large sums in the 1990s (up to 12 
thousand million euros at the beginning of the decade) have dropped sharply since 
that time. The progressive fall in European prices after the 1992, 1999 and 2003 
common agricultural policy reforms has reduced refunds to such an extent that they 
came to just under 2.5 thousand million euros in 2006. Previously this system was 
applied to meat and cereals but today it is applied mainly to sugar and dairy products, 
and in 2005 these sectors accounted for 72% of total export subsidies (1,141 million 
euros for dairy products and 1,081 million for sugar). 
 
            In spite of this sizeable reduction in European subsidies, they are still onerous 
in comparison to the MERCOSUR system, which does not involve this kind of 
subsidy. On the contrary, some countries such as Argentina levy heavy taxes on 
agricultural exports and this has a negative effect on the international competitiveness 
of these products. 
             
Domestic support 
 
There is no doubt that domestic support is far greater in the EU than in MERCOSUR. 
According to OECD calculations, the estimated Producer Support Estimated (PSE) in 
Europe in the 2002-2004 period was 34%, but in the extended MERCOSUR it was 
under 5%. 
 
            Despite this, it must be stressed that this mechanism for domestic support 
through the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), whereby producers were guaranteed 
high prices, has changed during the different reforms to the system of direct assistance 
for producers’ incomes, a mechanism that supposedly causes less distortion to 
international prices. Until 2005 internal assistance was linked to production activity 
and was dealt with through the different common market organizations (COM). In 
2005 most domestic support was transferred to the new Single Farm Payment (SFP), 
whereby each producer receives a single annual payment which is not linked to what 
is produced and which is reckoned in accordance with payments received during the 
reference period in prior years. In 2005, direct assistance for income, which came to 
33.7 thousand million euros, accounted for 69% of the total CAP budget. 
 
            Likewise, the relative weight of the sums allocated to the second pillar (Rural 
Development) in the global CAP budget has increased every year since the 1990s. In 
2001 the second pillar accounted for 10.3% of the CAP budget, in 2005 13.9%, and in 
2006 15.4%. Measures for rural development are divided into three categories: (i) 
restructuring and fostering competitiveness, (ii) environmental protection and (iii) 
land organization. 
 
            In the extended MERCOSUR there is no common agricultural policy and 
support for the agricultural sector can be measured by public spending allocated to the 
sector, which varies considerably from one country to another within the bloc. In 2005 
Chile spent the equivalent of 9.9% of agricultural GDP. It was the country with the 
highest public expenditure on agriculture, followed by Uruguay with 8% and then 
Bolivia with 4.8%, while Paraguay spent the least, 2.1%. It is worth noting how small 
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a proportion of public spending goes on agriculture in countries like Argentina (3%) 
and Brazil (2.67%). A large part of this spending is aimed at fostering production, but 
this does not apply to Uruguay where social expenditure is the biggest budget item 
followed by expenditure on infrastructure, and expenditure on fostering production 
comes only third on the list.  
 
            Expenditure on support for research and development in the different countries 
in the MERCOSUR region is still insufficient. In relative terms, Chile is the country 
that allocates most to this area, 1.02% of agricultural GDP, followed by Bolivia, 
Brazil and Argentina. Uruguay comes last in the ranking with only 0.4% of sectorial 
GDP. 
 
            Tax pressure on the agricultural sector – measured as the total of taxes levied 
on agriculture divided by agricultural GDP – varies considerably across the countries 
in the MERCOSUR region. According to this indicator, and on the basis of the policy 
matrix as reported to REDPA, in 2005 Argentina would seem to be the country 
applying the greatest tax pressure at 23.30%, followed by Paraguay with 7.37%, 
Uruguay with 6.90% and Brazil with 2.76%. It would seem that Bolivian agricultural 
producers hardly pay any taxes at all, since the tax burden in that country, apparently, 
amounted to only 0.06%.  
 
 
Key subjects in the bilateral negotiations 
 
In the light of the contextual factors mentioned above, it is possible to identify the 
following key subjects in the EU-MERCOSUR bilateral negotiations: 
 
• MERCOSUR is clearly on the offensive in the sphere of agriculture 
and it is promoting trade opening and market liberalisation in this 
sphere. The European Union, on the other hand, is maintaining a 
position that amounts to a defence of its own agricultural production, 
and it is providing internal support and applying mechanisms to control 
the volume of imported agricultural produce by maintaining tariff 
quotas. 
 
• As a consequence of this, the key point for MERCOSUR in the 
negotiations is to obtain greater access to the European market for its 
agricultural products. But greater access is unlikely to be obtained 
through a reduction in the EU tariffs applied to products the Europeans 
consider sensitive but which are most important for MERCOSUR 
exports. Given that it is improbable that the EU will drop its tariff 
quota system, the way forward in the negotiations would have to be 
through an increase that is acceptable to MERCOSUR in the tariff 
quotas the EU assigns to imports of agricultural products from the 
region, and a consensus agreement on the tariffs to be applied in the 
trade quota.  
 
• In addition, agricultural negotiations cannot be dealt with in isolation 
from the global framework of the negotiations, which also includes 
manufactured goods and services. It is obvious that the EU will not 
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substantially improve its 2004 agricultural offer unless there is an 
improvement on the part of MERCOSUR in connection with the offer 
about measures governing manufactured goods and services. 
 
• It should also be borne in mind that Europe’s support for its agriculture 
places EU producers in an advantageous competitive position in 
international markets (although to a lesser extent now due to the policy 
of ‘decoupling’) in comparison to their MERCOSUR counterparts, 
which have no such support and are in fact labouring under a 
considerable tax burden on the sector. This complicates still further the 
trade negotiations between the EU and MERCOSUR, and its impact 
extends far beyond bilateral agreements. The subject of internal 
assistance cannot possibly be solved at the bilateral level, and will thus 
depend on developments at the multilateral level of the WTO.  
 
• In a similar way, granting greater tariff quota latitude for MERCOSUR 
countries is closely linked to the multilateral negotiations in which the 
EU grants erga omnes tariff quota advantages that are open to all 
countries on a competitive basis. The question is whether the tariff 
quota advantages the EU grants MERCOSUR are to be a part of the 
erga omnes global tariff quota advantages which have already been 
established at the WTO, or whether they will be additional to these. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Bilateral trade negotiations between the European Union and MERCOSUR started in 
1995. After a first phase of dialogue at the political level, in 2001 the two blocs 
initiated negotiations on the goods and services to be included in the process of 
liberalisation, and a first list of sensitive products was drawn up. The central theme of 
the negotiations in the sphere of agriculture is access to the European market for 
MERCOSUR exports. 
 
            In their latest offer (October 2004), the EU based their proposal on a system of 
tariff contingency measures for sensitive products. The advantage of this system is 
that it will be possible to keep quantitative control of imports from MERCOSUR, and 
this is important to the Europeans as they fear there might be a dramatic increase in 
these imports if protection is exercised by means of tariffs alone. This 2004 European 
offer has been rejected by MERCOSUR, and negotiations have stagnated since then. 
 
            In this context, a comparative analysis of the two blocs’ agricultural policies is 
very relevant as it will determine each side’s objectives and the kinds of instruments 
used to pursue them. The most important element is obviously trade policy, but due 
attention must also be paid to other agricultural policy instruments. 
 
           In this study we carry out a comparative analysis of the trade and agricultural 
policies of the European Union and MERCOSUR, from the perspective of bilateral 
free trade negotiations. This analysis is based on information compiled and 
systematised in a database developed by ECLAC within the framework of the 
EuMercopol Project, with input from ECLAC itself, from IICA, and from other 
partners in the project and the Regional Network for the Coordination of Agricultural 
Policies (REDPA - Red Regional de Coordinación de Políticas Agropecuarias), which 
is made up by the Directors of Agricultural Policy of the extended MERCOSUR 
countries, which in turn make up the Agricultural Council of the South (CAS - 
Consejo Agropecuario del Sur). 
 
            In this study we refer to other studies on the subject3, which often concentrate 
on instruments of trade policy, and we develop factors that are specific to domestic 
support for agricultural policy. We also take advantage of recent studies compiling 
and making comparative analyses of agricultural policies, carried out by IICA and 
REDPA. 
 
            In drafting this report we have sought a synthesis, stressing each policy’s 
outstanding characteristics and relating them to the objectives pursued. So as not to 
distract the reader’s attention with too many figures, much of the quantitative 
information has been placed in the annexes. 
 
                                                 
3 Among the different studies on the subject of policies connected to the agricultural sector, the following deserve 
mention: OECD annual reports, studies coordinated by ICONE Brazil and studies carried out by the ‘Chaire 
Mersosur de Sciences Pau’. One characteristic all these studies have in common is that they always stress aspects 
of trade policy but do not say much about other measures, especially those in the realm of domestic support. 
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            This study is organised in six chapters. Chapters 2 and 3 are a brief summary 
of the general framework of economic and agricultural policy and the role of the 
agricultural sector in the European Union and MERCOSUR. They also make 
reference to aspects of the macroeconomic context that affect the agricultural sector. 
Chapter 3 sets out the objectives of EU and MERCOSUR policies, so as to put these 
policies in perspective and understand the coherence of different measures: we 
analyse them as converging elements in a strategy to achieve the above-mentioned 
objectives.   
 
            In Chapter 4 there is a detailed comparative analysis of different trade policies 
and policies by sector that affect agriculture. In the first part, policies governing 
access to markets are analysed, and in the second, policies governing support for 
agriculture. The instruments implemented by each bloc are described by section, and 
the chapter concludes with observations in which their points of convergence and 
divergence are examined.  
 
            Finally, in Chapter 5 we present a summary of the offers that have been 
proposed for access to markets by the EU and MERCOSUR in the course of the 
bilateral negotiations, and in Chapter 6 we present our conclusions. 
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2. THE MACROECONOMIC CONTEXT AND                
CONTEXT BY SECTOR OF THE 
EXTENDED MERCOSUR AND THE 
EUROPEAN UNION 
 
 
2.1 Economic Dimension 
 
 
The extended MERCOSUR4 enjoys enormous relative importance in Latin America 
and the Caribbean. It has a consumer market of 264.5 million inhabitants and a Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) equivalent to 57% of the total for Latin America and the 
Caribbean. Its exports amount to one third of the total for the region. 
 
            Nevertheless, in economic terms MERCOSUR and the EU are very 
asymmetrical. EU-25 has just under double the total population and an economically 
active population (EAP) that is 3.1 times greater than that of the extended 
MERCOSUR, but its GDP is 9.3 times greater than that of the southern bloc. These 
economic indicators go a long way towards explaining why the EU-25’s per capita 
GDP is more than five times that of the extended MERCOSUR.  
 
CHART 1 
EXTENDED MERCOSUR-EU: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 2005-6 
Countries Population 
(thousands) 
2005 
EAP 
(thousands)  
2005 
Total surface 
area (million 
hectares) 
GDP 
(thousand 
million USD) 
2006 at 
corrrent prices 
Per capita 
GDP (USD) 
2006 at 
current prices 
Exports 
(thousand 
million USD) 
2006 
Argentina 38,971 17,366 278.0 214.3 5,498 53.0 
Brazil 190,128 94,421 851.5 1,067.8 5,616 156.5 
Bolivia 9,627 4,164 109.8 11.2 1,160 4.7 
Chile 16,436 6,968 75.7 145.8 8,873 66.2 
Paraguay 6,009 2,487 40.7 9.0 1,501 5.3 
Uruguay 3,324 1,594 17.6 19.3 5,809 5.8 
TOTAL 
MERCOSUR 
264,495 126,980 1,371.3 1,467.4 5,547 193.3 
European 
Union EU-25 
459,500 390,000 383.2 13,629.4 29,484 1,348.2 
Source: For the MERCOSUR countries, ECLAC database and 2007 Economic Report on Latin 
America and the Caribbean. For the European Union, EUROSTAT database and EUROPE IN 
FIGURES – EUROSTAT Yearbook 2006-07.  
 
Another important factor is that Brazil has great economic weight in the extended 
MERCOSUR. This country alone accounts for 72% of the bloc’s population, 62% of 
its area, 73% of its GDP and 81% of its exports. This is completely unlike the 
situation in the EU, where Germany, the most populous country and the one with the 
highest GDP, accounts for only 18% of EU-25’s population and 19% of its GDP. 
                                                 
4 For the purposes of this study, ‘the extended MERCOSUR’ is defined as the bloc consisting of the four founding 
members (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay) plus Chile and Bolivia as associate countries. 
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However, Europe’s agricultural production is relatively concentrated, since the top 
three agricultural countries (France, Spain and Italy) account for 54% of European 
agricultural GDP.  
 
          The dynamics of growth in the Latin American and Caribbean countries have 
been quite favourable over the last four years: in 2007 GDP grew by 8.6% in 
Argentina, 3.8% in Bolivia, 5.3% in Brazil and Chile, 5.5% in Paraguay and 7.5% in 
Uruguay. Over the same period, economic growth in the EU was lower at only 2.6% 
in 2007 following 2.8% in 2006 and only 1.6% in 2005.   
 
            As regards the prospects for the immediate future, according to an IMF report 
published in April 20085, it is estimated that the growth rate of the world economy 
will drop to 3.5% in 2008 and 2009. Nevertheless, as long as the world’s main 
emerging economies (especially China and India) keep on growing with the same 
dynamism they have exhibited up to now, the extended MERCOSUR countries will 
continue to benefit from high prices for the commodities they export (copper, soya 
beans, cereals, and to a lesser extent meat and dairy products), although it must be 
borne in mind that these profits will be severely reduced (or possibly even cancelled 
out) by an increase in agricultural production costs (energy, agrochemicals, 
transportation, etc.) and distortions caused by speculative factors behind the increase 
in foodstuff prices.  
 
            It is clear from the above that the EU-MERCOSUR Economic Association 
Agreement cannot sidestep the question of the asymmetry between the economies of 
the two blocs. This aspect has become an inevitable feature of all third generation 
economic agreements, and it is now an established fact that economically more 
powerful blocs or countries have to make greater concessions to weaker trading 
partners. 
 
 
 
2.2. The Share of Agriculture in the Economy 
 
The two blocs are very asymmetrical in the economic dimension, and they are also 
asymmetrical when it comes to agriculture. EU-25 has an agricultural area of 167 
million hectares, which is equivalent to one third of MERCOSUR’s, but European 
production systems are far more intensive and in 2005 this sector generated an 
agricultural GDP of 202 thousand million US dollars, which was approximately three 
times the figure for MERCOSUR. Similarly, in 2005 European agricultural exports 
came to 91 thousand million US dollars, which was five times greater than 
MERCOSUR’s. 
 
          The picture changes considerably when we consider agriculture’s contribution 
to the overall economy of each bloc. Agriculture is an important sector in the 
economies of the MERCOSUR economies, and although its relative weight is 
gradually diminishing it is greater than the weight of agriculture in the EU economies, 
according to all the indicators shown in Chart 2. 
                                                 
5  International Monetary Fund: Economic Perspectives in the Americas, April 2008. Economic and Financial 
Studies. 
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• On average, agriculture’s contribution to GDP is 5.1% in the extended 
MERCOSUR as against only 1.2% in Europe. 
 
• Agriculture’s contribution to exports is 9.5% in the extended MERCOSUR as 
against 6.1% in Europe. 
 
• Agriculture’s share of the extended MERCOSUR’s economically active 
population is 16.3%, in contrast to only 4.7% in Europe. 
 
            These economic indicators for Europe must be variegated because they do not 
show the agricultural sector’s political weight in public debate and decision-making at 
the political level, which is important in some countries like France, Spain, Italy and 
Greece. In these countries, the agriculture lobby has far greater influence, both with 
their own governments and with the European Community in Brussels, than is 
immediately apparent just from considering these indicators.   
 
Differences among countries 
 
Behind these averages there are big differences between different countries in the 
same bloc, not only in MERCOSUR but also in the EU. 
 
• In the case of MERCOSUR, there are considerable differences between the 
agricultural GDP / total GDP ratios in different countries. This indicator 
ranges from 3.9% in Chile to 20.7% in Paraguay. Similarly, the European 
average is 1.2% but some countries are in very different situations: 0.4 to 0.5% 
in the Northern countries (Sweden, Finland, Great Britain), 0.7 to 0.8% in 
Germany and Belgium, 1.5 to 2.5% in the Mediterranean countries (France, 
Spain and Italy), and over 5% for some East European countries (Romania, 
Bulgaria). 
 
• There are also considerable differences in the percentage of the active 
population involved in agriculture. In Argentina and Uruguay it is under 5%, 
but it is 12% in Chile, 19% in Brazil, and over 30% in Bolivia and Paraguay. 
In the European Union the average is 4.7%, but values are far higher in the 
new member countries. The average is only 3.7% in EU-15, but more than 
10% in the Baltic countries, 15% in Poland, and as high as 30% in Romania. 
 
• The average size of farms in EU-25 is 16.0 hectares, but farms are much larger 
in Western Europe (in EU-15 the average size of 21.4 hectares) than in the ten 
new member countries, where average farm size is only 4.5 hectares. 
 
 
CHART 2 
EXTENDED MERCOSUR-EU: INDICATORS OF THE IMPORTANCE OF 
AGRICULTURE IN THE ECONOMY. 2005 
  Argentina Bolivia Brazil Chile Paraguay Uruguay MERCOSUR EU-25 
Agricultural 
GDP (thousand 
million USD) 
16.5 1.2 48.2 5.6 1.9 1.8 65.9 201.8
 15
Agricultural 
GDP / total 
GDP 
7.7 % 11.0 % 4.5 % 3.9 % 20.7 % 9.2 % 5.1 % 1.2 %
Agriculture 
exports 
(thousand 
million USD) 
7.7 0.16 12.9 5.5 0.8 0.7 18.4 91.1
Agriculture 
exports / total 
exports 
15.6 % 4.2 % 4.0 % 9.4 % 15.7  % 15.6 % 9.5 % 6.1%
Economically 
active 
population in 
agriculture 
(million) 
0.14 1.3 17.6 0.9 0.8 0.01 20.8 9.5
Ag, population 
/ total 
population 
0.8 % 32.3 % 18.6% 12.5% 31.1 % 4.6 % 16.3 % 4.7 %
Agricultural 
area (million 
hectares) 
129.3 37.8 263.6 15.2 24.3 14.9 485.2 166.8
Ag. area / total 
area 47.3 % 34.8 % 31.2% 20.4% 61.1 % 85.4 % 35.7 % 43.5 %
Source: a) Agricultural GDP and total GDP; Agricultural and total exports; EAP; agricultural and total 
surface areas: Economic Report for Latin America and Caribbean, ECLAC; b) Agricultural EAP: 
Household Surveys in the different countries. 
 
            Another important factor is the behaviour of international prices for the 
exportable production of the countries in the extended MERCOSUR. Argentina, 
Brazil, Uruguay and Paraguay, and to a lesser extent Bolivia, have benefited over the 
last two or three years from the evolution of favourable international prices for soya 
beans, cereals, beef and dairy produce. In Chile, however, the situation is rather 
different because prices for most for-export fruit have been falling. In Europe, the rise 
in agricultural prices has had very different impacts depending on the product under 
consideration; in general, cereal producers have benefited far more than cattle farmers 
or fruit and vegetable producers. 
 
            We saw above that average agricultural productivity is far greater in Europe 
than in the Southern Cone of South America, and also that in economic and social 
terms, and therefore in terms of political stability as well, agricultural production is far 
more important in the extended MERCOSUR than in the EU.  
 
 
 
2.3. EU-MERCOSUR Trade Flows 
 
The balance of trade between the two blocs is structurally favourable to MERCOSUR, 
as can be seen in Chart 3. 
 
• With exports worth 30.7 thousand million euros and imports totalling only 
20.7 thousand million euros, in 2005 MERCOSUR enjoyed a favourable 
balance of trade with the EU, and the surplus came to 10 thousand million 
euros. 
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• This is entirely due to agricultural products, to the fact that trade flows in this 
sector are completely out of balance. In 2005, EU-25’s agricultural imports 
from MERCOSUR amounted to over 14 thousand million euros while exports 
amounted to only 699 million euros. 
 
• The non-agricultural balance of trade is in Europe’s favour: the difference is 
slightly over 3 thousand million euros. 
 
• All this makes agriculture strategically important in the two bloc’s trade 
relations. Agricultural products make up almost half of MERCOSUR exports 
to the European Union, and without them the current favourable balance of 
trade would become negative. 
 
CHART 3 
MERCOSUR-EU: TRADE EXCHANGE, 2005 
(million euros) 
 Agricultural products All products 
EU imports from MERCOSUR 14,027 30,718 
EU exports to MERCOSUR 699 20,676 
EU trade balance - 13,328 - 10,042 
Source: European Economic Commission (Eurostat and General Directorate of Agriculture and Rural 
Development). 
 
          EU-25’s agricultural imports from MERCOSUR are concentrated in relatively 
few products, as can be seen in Chart 4. Animal feed, which is considered as by-
products and waste products from foodstuff industries, accounts for almost one third 
of these imports, while oleaginous seeds and fruit (mainly soya bean) account for 
another 18%. The other main MERCOSUR products entering the European market 
are meat (11.5%), coffee (9%) and fruit (7.7%). 
 
CHART 4 
EU-25: BREAKDOWN OF AGRICULTURAL IMPORTS  
FROM MERCOSUR, 2005 
 Value of imports in million euros Relative weight 
Animal feed (code 23) 4,238 30.2 % 
Oleaginous seeds and fruit (12) 2,503 17.8 % 
Meat (02) 1,617 11.5 % 
Coffee and other plant stimulants (09) 1,261 9.0 % 
Fruit (08) 1,078 7.7 % 
Total of agricultural imports 14,027 100 % 
Source: European Commission (Eurostat and General Directorate of Agriculture and Rural Development). 
 
 
            This structure of European imports does not reflect MERCOSUR’s agro-
export potential as it does not include the main products where the latter enjoys 
comparative advantages in the world market. The small proportion of meat in 
MERCOSUR exports to Europe, and the near-total absence of cereals, dairy products 
and sugar, are a direct consequence of EU policies to defend its markets against Latin 
American produce. 
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2.4. Other Factors in the Economic Context: Exchange Rates 
and Foreign Direct Investment          
 
Exchange Rates 
 
There is no doubt that exchange rates have great influence on any country’s export 
competitiveness. With this in mind, it is important to note that the euro and the 
currencies of several MERCOSUR countries have evolved in a similar way with 
respect to the US dollar, as can be seen in Figure 1. The price of the dollar against 
local currencies increased up to 2003 in almost every country, but since then it has 
dropped systematically except in Argentina. 
 
 
FIGURE 1 
EXTENDED MERCOSUR-EU: EVOLUTION OF THE EXCHANGE RATE  
(2003=100) 
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Source: Countries’ Central Banks. 
                 * The datum for 2008 is an average value between January and April of that year. 
 
TEXT 
porcentaje = percentage 
años = years 
Peso argentino = Peso Argentina 
Real (Brasil) = Real Brazil 
Dolar/Euro = Dollar/Euro 
Peso uruguayo = Peso Uruguay 
Euro/Dolar = Euro/Dollar 
 
The steady appreciation of other national currencies against the US dollar over 
the last few years has negatively affected the production of export goods: imports 
have become cheaper and unemployment rates in export sectors have risen. 
Unemployment has also increased in activities producing goods for domestic 
consumption that have been replaced by imports.  
 
          In all the extended MERCOSUR countries, the exchange rate is subject to 
market forces and fluctuates, although occasionally the different countries’ central 
banks intervene and buy or sell foreign exchange to avoid extreme variations. This 
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kind of intervention has become increasing common recently as a consequence of the 
strengthening of local currencies against the US dollar in all the MERCOSUR 
countries, but it has not been sufficient to reverse the trend. The one exception is 
Argentina, where unlike in the rest of the region, the central bank has intervened to 
avoid increases in the value of the US dollar due to excessive demand, as happened in 
May, 2008. 
 
           To sum up, the behaviour of exchange rates indicates that although the 
strengthening of the euro against the US dollar apparently made MERCOSUR exports 
more competitive, this greater competitiveness has been completely offset or 
significantly reduced because the currencies of the MERCOSUR countries have also 
grown stronger against the US dollar, with the single exception of Argentina, and the 
prices of the imported inputs that the extended MERCOSUR’s agricultural production 
and trade heavily depend on have also risen. 
 
            The situation in terms of actual effective exchange rates is shown in the figure 
below. It can be seen that, with the exception of Argentina and Bolivia, the currencies 
of the rest of the MERCOSUR countries have been steadily getting more expensive in 
terms of the US dollar. The country that has been affected most is Brazil, which has 
slid back by no less than 43.6%, followed by Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay. 
 
 
FIGURE 2 
Evolución del Indice Efectivo Tipo de Cambio 
Real Total entre los años  2003 y  2007 (2000=100)
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Source: Prepared by César Morales on the basis of information in the ECLAC Preliminary Balance of 
Latin American and Caribbean Economies, 2007. The total real effective exchange rate is calculated by 
weighting the real bilateral exchange rates of each trade partner by that partner’s share of trade (exports 
plus imports) in the country’s total trade. The real extra-regional effective exchange rate index does not 
include trade with other countries in South America and the Caribbean. 
 
 
TEXT 
Evolución del Indice... = Evolution of Effective Exchange Rate between 2003 and 
2007 (2000 = 100) 
Brasil = Brazil 
 
Accumulated foreign direct investment in MERCOSUR 
 
 19
Foreign direct investment flows are actually a form of external savings and one of the 
main sources of private investment funding. Thus this form of investment contributes 
to economic growth, technology transfer, increased productivity and development. 
 
            In the extended MERCOSUR, the figures for accumulated FDI (foreign direct 
investment) from 2000 to 2005 vary considerably from one country to another. For 
instance, Brazil received almost 147 thousand million US dollars, but in Uruguay no 
foreign investments are reported for that period. FDI in agriculture is minimal and 
amounts to only 0.8% of total FDI in Brazil. 
 
          There is no doubt that free trade agreements and agreements protecting foreign 
investment enhance the ability of countries to attract foreign investment, because they 
offer a greater degree of stability and legal security in economic relations between 
countries. 
 
          The European Union is one of the main investors in the region. In Chile and 
Brazil the EU provides almost 50% of total FDI, in Bolivia it provides 35% and in 
Paraguay and Argentina the EU share of FDI is about 10% of the total. 
 
 
CHART 5 
ENTRY FLOW OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT (FDI) IN MERCOSUR 
ACCUMULATED 2002-2005 
(thousand million US dollars) 
  Argentina Bolivia Brazil Chile Paraguay Uruguay 
Total FDI flows entering 
country  115.1 4.5 146.9 22.5 0.2 0.0 
FDI flows from the EU  11.9 1.3 68.3 10.8 0.03 0 
Share of EU in total FDI flows 
(%) 10 % 35 % 47 % 48 % 12 % n/a 
EU enterprises with mergers 
and acquisitions in the 
agriculture, foodstuffs, 
beverages and tobacco sectors 
in MERCOSUR (Value of 
transaction in million USD) 
Quilmes industr. 
SA (36.5),  
Salvia Netherland 
(4.9), British 
American Tobacco 
(0.92) 
n/a Inbev (2.984), Tereos (47.7) 
Cermaq ASA 
(23.0) n/a n/a 
Restriction rating in the FDI* 
0.125 
(manufacture); 
0.145 (total)  
no data 
0.100 
(manufacture)
0.195 (total)  
0.025 
(manufacture); 
0.107 (total)  
no data no data 
Sources: ECLAC, based on central banks for FDI flows and on Bloomberg for mergers and acquisitions; OECD 
for FDI Restrictiveness Index.  
* The index ranges from 1 to 0. The closer to zero, the more open the economy receiving the FDI. The indicator 
measures discriminatory treatment of foreign enterprises before and after the arrival of capital. For further 
information see OECD (2006), “OECD’s FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness Index: Revision and Extension to more 
Economies”, OECD Working Papers on International Investment, 2006/4, OECD Publishing. 
 
Outgoing investment flows 
 
The major flows of outgoing investment from Brazil and Argentina are directly 
related to the larger size of these economies as compared to the other countries in the 
region. In the case of Chile, however, outgoing investment can be attributed to this 
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country’s policy of global insertion, while in the case of Uruguay, a small economy, it 
would seem to be related to this country’s role as a regional financial centre. 
 
 
 
CHART 6 
OUTGOING FLOWS OF INTRA-REGIONAL* FOREIGN DIRECT 
INVESTMENT, 2000-2005. 
(million US dollars) 
  Argentina Bolivia Brazil Chile Paraguay Uruguay 
Total outgoing FDI flows  1,244.0 3.0 1,212.0 993.0 11.0 1,480.0 
Outgoing FDI flows to MERCOSUR 
countries 958.0 2.0 459.0 379.0 10.0 1,308.0 
MERCOSUR share as destination of 
FDI (%) 77.0% 74.3% 37.9% 38.2% 97.7% 88.4% 
Source: ECLAC 
*Flows of outgoing foreign direct investment made by extended MERCOSUR countries in other extended 
MERCOSUR countries. 
 
            Outgoing investment flows from the extended MERCOSUR countries go 
mainly to other countries in the region. In Paraguay this intra-regional flow amounts 
to 97.7%, in Uruguay 88.4%, in Argentina 77% and in Bolivia 74.3%. 
 
            An analysis of foreign investment shows that an EU-MERCOSUR bilateral 
agreement will also benefit European enterprises located in the extended 
MERCOSUR countries, particularly those in Brazil, Bolivia and Chile. EU 
investments amount to more than one third of total foreign investment in Brazil and 
almost half the foreign investment in Bolivia and Chile.  
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3.  GENERAL OBJECTIVES OF EXTENDED 
MERCOSUR AND EUROPEAN UNION 
AGRICULTURAL POLICY 
 
 
3.1. European Union: Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 
 
Unlike the extended MERCOSUR, the European Union does have a Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP). Since its inception in the early 1960s the CAP has 
undergone many important changes which can be interpreted in the light of the 
progressive evolution of its objectives. These have been gradually modified over the 
years to cater to changes in both the internal context (rises in the extent of coverage of 
the community market, increases in budget costs) and the external context 
(multilateral trade negotiations, the evolution of world markets). 
 
The initial CAP: 1962-1992 
 
            The CAP came into being in the early 1960s when the different European 
countries were undergoing severe food shortages. For this reason, the main goal of the 
first version of the CAP was to increase productivity and production so as to be able 
to supply the internal market and reduce this shortfall as much as possible. The 
objectives of the first CAP were as follows: i) to promote an equitable quality of life 
for the rural population, ii) to stabilise markets, iii) to guarantee supplies, and iv) to 
supply consumers at reasonable prices. 
 
            The first measure adopted in pursuit of these objectives was the introduction 
of guaranteed prices. These were often far higher than international market prices so 
they provided a great incentive for production in many areas. These measures were 
supplemented with high import tariffs to protect European production. 
 
Different reforms as of 1992 
 
          The goal of eliminating shortages was attained for many products, and during 
the 1980s surpluses of different products such as cereals, milk and meat, began to 
accumulate. These surpluses have given rise to two kinds of problems: first, inside the 
EU there was a sharp rise in the cost of the CAP (storage costs and also refunds to sell 
surpluses on the world market), and second, outside the EU the appearance of 
subsidised exports tended to distort these products’ competitiveness in world trade. 
 
          In 1992, in response to this new context, the European Union introduced its first 
important reform to the CAP, with far-reaching changes to policy objectives. The 
initial target of increasing production was set aside, and fresh objectives were set: 
 
• To contain the increases in production and public spending. 
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• To maintain the competitiveness of European agriculture by closing the gap 
between domestic (European) and world prices. 
 
          For the first time, rural development objectives were added to the market-
oriented objectives: 
 
• To reduce inequality in the distribution of assistance. 
 
• To guide agriculture towards a model that does more to foster environmental 
protection and land organization.  
 
There were subsequent reforms in 1999 and 2003 that helped strengthen the 
1992 orientation. The previous strict agricultural policy was replaced by a rural 
development policy in which two core elements were clearly identified as ‘pillars’. 
 
The first and more classical pillar was market support, and the second was to 
promote rural development with financial instruments and funding lines designed 
specifically for this purpose. The stated objectives of the 2003 reform were as 
follows: 
 
• To align production to market needs. 
 
• To make CAP instruments compatible with WTO requirements. 
 
• To take consumers’ and people’s wishes into account regarding care of the 
environment, the production of amenities, sanitary quality, animal welfare and 
the balanced development of rural areas. 
 
The reformulation of objectives embodied in the different reforms brought 
about a gradual decrease in the prices guaranteed to producers, and a portion of the 
subsidies corresponding to price differentials were changed into direct income 
assistance. A consequence of this was that export subsidies decreased, due to the 
double effect of decreasing surpluses and a drop in the price gap between European 
and world market prices. Along the same lines, new conditions for granting these new 
kinds of direct assistance were introduced such as production standards promoting 
care for the environment, sanitary standards and animal welfare regulations, as an 
expression of concern about the environment and rural development. 
 
            As a consequence of the different reforms in the CAP, it gradually lost the 
healthy approval on the part of the general public it had enjoyed in the early years. In 
the 1960s and 70s there was a consensus among the member countries and public 
opinion was favourable to the social objectives inherent in the CAP. The instruments 
that were implemented were clearly designed to attain objectives set for the CAP. The 
successive reforms that were introduced to respond to internal pressure (to limit rising 
budget cost) and external pressure (to conform to WTO requirements) caused the 
instruments to be changed to such an extent that they no longer corresponded to any 
clearly identified vision for the future of society. As a consequence the early public 
approval of the CAP has waned somewhat, and today it is heavily criticised by a 
public that does not understand the rationale of direct income assistance that a 
relatively small number of large producers have won for themselves. 
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3.2. Agricultural Policies in the Extended MERCOSUR 
 
Towards the end of 1980 a new economic model was introduced in Latin America 
(with the exception of a few countries, such as Chile, which had initiated this process 
during the previous decade), and as a result some public policies were reformulated. 
 
            Up to that time the state had played a dominant and even overbearing role in 
agriculture with public enterprises involved in the storage and marketing of 
agricultural produce, providing credit for the sector, supplying services, and there 
were trade restrictions, price bands and subsidies for producers, multiple exchange 
rates, restrictions on the ownership of land, etc. When a more market-oriented 
economic model supervened the state started to withdraw from agriculture as part of 
its overall strategy. One of the factors that encouraged this trend was the opinion of 
certain analysts that the previous bias in favour of urban areas would be rectified with 
the application of sectorially neutral policies. 
 
           In the 1990s and the early years of the new century, there were far-reaching 
changes in the nature of agricultural policies and agro-food systems, partly in 
response to increasing economic globalisation, changes in political and economic 
forces, technological progress and a greater emphasis on the sanitary quality of 
foodstuffs and protection of the environment. 
 
            It gradually became harder to use the traditional instruments for analysis and 
traditional policies to incorporate the variables needed to examine subjects such as 
negotiations at the World Trade Organisation (WTO), and also to combine rules 
governing entry into markets, domestic support, export subsidies, non-tariff barriers, 
rules of origin and sanitary and phytosanitary regulations with general WTO 
regulations, and as of the 1990s a second generation of reforms were introduced. This 
involved the application of new economy measures in institutions and greater 
consideration for the effects of globalisation, in what has come to be called ‘getting 
institutions right’.6 
 
            Even though these reforms were enacted throughout the MERCOSUR region, 
this has not led to the implementation of a common agricultural policy in the extended 
MERCOSUR countries in spite of the fact that, as of 2003, there has been significant 
progress in the institutions involved in terms of coordinating agricultural policies, 
with the creation of the Agricultural Council for the South (CAS - Consejo 
Agropecuario del Sur) as a regional forum for the Ministers of Agriculture from the 
four original MERCOSUR countries plus Chile and Bolivia. 
 
            At the first meeting of the CAS (Brasilia, May 2002), regional coordination 
networks were set up as technical bodies to furnish support at the political level. 
These networks included the six countries’ top technical authorities on agricultural 
policy and negotiation, sanitary matters and agricultural technology.   
 
                                                 
6  Taken from Mario Cimoli, Martina Sirven, Carlo Ferraro, João Carlos Ferraz, Nicolo Gligo, Martin Hilbert, 
Wilson Peres, Analiza Primi and Giovanni Stumpo (2007). Cinco piezas de política de desarrollo productivo. 
Desarrollo Productivo Series. Santiago de Chile: ECLAC. 
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            These networks are the Regional Network for the Coordination of Agricultural 
Policy (REDPA), the Informal Group for Agricultural Negotiation (GINA Sur) and 
the Permanent Veterinary Committee (CVP), which were set up along with the CAS, 
and also the Regional Committee on Plant Health for the Southern Cone (COSAVE) 
and the Cooperative Program for the Agro-alimentary and Agro-industrial 
Technological Development of the Southern Cone (PROCISUR), which has been in 
existence for 25 years. 
 
            There are two further entities that serve as regional interlocutors with the 
ministerial forum in the academic environment and the private sector, namely the 
Forum of Agronomy Faculties of MERCOSUR, Bolivia and Chile, and the regional 
agricultural private sector forum, which includes the Federation of Rural Associations 
of MERCOSUR, Bolivia and Chile (FARM) as the main regional organization of 
large agricultural producers. 
 
            In this context, one of the major objectives of the extended MERCOSUR 
countries’ agricultural policy over the last two decades has been to promote adequate 
penetration in the international market of their different agricultural products, in 
harmony with the macro policies that are geared to the same objective at the global 
level. In the last few years some other very important policies have been added to 
those mentioned above as a result of political change in the region. These include 
policies to incorporate small farmers into commercial groupings (particularly in Brazil 
and Chile) and policies to combat poverty in rural areas.  
 
 
3.3. Some Comparative Reflections 
 
In order to analyse the objectives the two blocs are pursuing in their agricultural 
policies, it must be borne in mind that CAP dates from the 1960s when there was a 
foodstuffs shortfall in Europe, while the member countries of the present day 
extended MERCOSUR, particularly Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay, have traditionally 
been foodstuff exporters. 
 
            As a result, the objectives of the EU Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) have 
always been to defend and protect European agricultural production, with an overall 
vision of foodstuff self-sufficiency and security. This has been maintained even when 
criteria limiting increases in production and incorporating care of the environment 
gradually came into play after the 1992 CAP reform process. 
 
            The MERCOSUR has no common policy for agriculture, but there has been a 
powerful move in all the countries in the bloc towards external opening and increased 
insertion into international markets. In this context, these countries have formulated 
and applied policies to strengthen competitiveness and have sought improved 
conditions of access to third markets through bilateral and multilateral trade 
agreements. 
 
            These different objectives must be taken into account in the negotiation of 
bilateral trade agreements, especially as the prevailing international regulations and 
the dynamics of globalisation are geared to facilitating international penetration. 
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Furthermore, in pursuit of these objectives, the Southern Cone countries have greatly 
liberalised access to their own markets and, in contrast to the EU, they do not 
subsidise their agriculture. Likewise, it is obvious that European subsidy and support 
measures have placed EU agriculture in a better position to compete in international 
markets as it is more competitive than MERCOSUR agriculture, which not only does 
not receive such support but is labouring under a considerable tax burden.   
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4. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF TRADE AND 
AGRICULTURAL POLICIES 
 
            The European Union countries and the MERCOSUR countries both comply 
with WTO rules as regards market access. Moreover, the countries in both blocs grant 
preferential access conditions to countries with which they have bilateral or bloc trade 
agreements. Details of the main agreements that the EU and MERCOSUR had in 
force in 2007 are given in Annexes 2 and 3. It can be seen from this that the extended 
MERCOSUR countries have been very dynamic in the sphere of signing trade 
agreements. 
 
            Chile is the extended MERCOSUR country with the highest number of trade 
agreements. As at 2007 it had 19 agreements in force involving 54 countries. Most of 
the agreements signed by the other countries in the region are basically part of the 
MERCOSUR integration process or that of the Andean Community of Nations, within 
the framework of the Latin American Integration Association (ALADI )7.   
 
            The main European trade agreements have been made with non-EU countries 
in Europe and with the 78 ACP (Africa, Caribbean and Pacific) countries. As for 
Latin America, the EU has only signed agreements with Mexico and Chile, but 
negotiations in this field are in progress with Central America, the Andean 
Community and MERCOSUR. 
 
            From the above it is apparent that MERCOSUR is focusing on a policy of 
international insertion for its economies and agriculture that is rather more aggressive 
and open than the European strategy, which has geared its agreements to markets that 
have traditionally been dependent or protected. 
 
            We present below a comparative analysis of this chapter, ordered in 
accordance with the nomenclature of the WTO agricultural agreement. In the first 
section we deal with measures related to market access, in the second we deal with 
export subsidies and taxes, and in the third we focus on domestic support for 
agriculture. 
 
 
 
4.1. Market Access Policies 
 
 
4.1.1. Tariffs 
 
a) General Framework 
                                                 
7 The member countries of ALADI are Mexico, Cuba, Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Uruguay, Paraguay, Argentina and Chile. 
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            The European Union grants a unilateral preference scheme called the 
Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) to nations not in the category of 
industrialised countries. The GSP was completely overhauled on 1 July 2005. There 
are three components to this new system: 
 
• A general regime. 
 
• A special, more favourable, regime called GSP Plus for countries complying 
with specific requirements in terms of sustainable development and good 
governance. 
 
• A specific regime for less developed countries, called ‘Everything Except 
Weapons’, which involves exemption from all tariffs and quotas. 
 
The European Union applies the basic GSP regime to MERCOSUR countries. 
This consists basically of preferential access for goods on a list established by the EU 
and classified as sensitive or non-sensitive. Non-sensitive products enter the European 
market with no tariffs, while sensitive products may enter the market paying a tariff 
that is below the Most Favoured Nation level.8 This gives MERCOSUR exports a 
degree of preferential access compared to other industrialised countries’ exports to 
Europe, but it does not grant MERCOSUR greater preferential treatment than that 
accorded to other developing countries.   
 
            In MERCOSUR, a common external tariff (CET) has been in force since 
2005, and today European Union goods do not enjoy preferential access to any 
MERCOSUR countries except Chile and Bolivia, which are associate members and 
apply a lower tariff level than the MECOSUR common external tariff. 
 
            It should be borne in mind that, under the current arrangements, the 
MERCOSUR countries enjoy preferential treatment that goes one way because they 
benefit from the EU GSP regime, but there is no form of tariff preference for products 
from the European Union entering MERCOSUR. This situation is due to the fact that, 
up to the present time, no EU-MERCOSUR preferential trade agreement has been 
signed, beyond the unilateral scheme the EU applies to imports from less developed 
countries.  
 
             
b) Average Tariffs 
 
            At present the European Union uses three different types of tariff in the 
agricultural sector: ad valorem, specific, and mixed. In this study we will use data 
from the MacMaps database, which gives the ad valorem equivalents of specific and 
mixed tariffs, and this enables us to make a more exact comparison of the EU and 
MERCOSUR positions.   
 
                                                 
8  For further details of the GSP scheme and the lists of products and tariffs applied under this regime, see Rule 
980/2005 of the European Community.  
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServe.do?uri=OJ:L:2005:169:0001:0043:ES:PDF 
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            The tariff applied by the European Union for practically all agricultural 
products is the same as the tariff established at the WTO. On average, the EU tariff is 
just under 20% for agricultural products. When we include in the calculation tariff 
preferences granted to countries with which the EU has some bilateral agreement, this 
average drops to 14.7%. 
 
 
CHART 7 
EXTENDED MERCOSUR-EU: SIMPLE AVERAGE OF PREFERENTIAL 
TARIFFS (PT) AND MOST FAVOURED NATION (MFN) TARIFFS, 2004 
 Importing or informing country 
 Argentina Bolivia Brazil Chile Paraguay Uruguay EU-25 
 PT NFN PT MFN PT MFN PT MFN PT MFN PT MFN PT MFN 
Total 
agricultural 
products 11.6 12.3 9.6 10.0 11.7 12.4 5.4 6.1 11.6 12.1 11.7 12.4 14.7 19.8 
               
By trade 
partners 
              
MERCOSUR 0.0 12.0 3.9 10.0 0.0 12.1 0.4 6.1 0.2 12.0 0.1 12.0 20.2 20.7 
EU-25 11.5 11.5 10.0 10.0 11.6 11.6 6.1 6.1 11.5 11.5 11.6 11.6     
Bolivia 5.3 11.7     3.4 11.6 2.4 6.0 9.8 11.6 8.7 12.0 12.2 16.7 
Chile 8.7 12.2 7.8 10.0 8.9 12.5     11.2 12.2 10.4 12.2 16.0 20.4 
               
By sub-sectors (Agricultural sector chapter) 
Meat (02) 10.7 11.6 9.6 10.0 10.9 11.6 6.9 7.7 10.9 11.6 10.7 11.6 40.9 46.4 
Dairy (04) 14.8 15.7 9.6 10.0 17.2 18.1 5.5 6.0 15.0 15.7 14.8 15.7 64.4 70.6 
Vegetables (07) 9.4 9.8 9.8 10.0 9.1 9.7 5.4 6.0 9.4 9.9 9.4 9.8 8.9 16.2 
Fruit (08) 10.8 11.4 9.6 10.0 11.1 11.8 5.4 6.0 10.7 11.3 10.8 11.4 3.2 6.6 
Cereals (10) 6.7 7.2 9.4 10.0 6.9 7.5 5.4 6.0 7.2 7.7 6.3 6.8 45.6 49.4 
Sugar and 
confectionary 
(17) 18.7 19.5 9.8 10.0 17.4 18.3 5.6 6.0 20.7 21.3 19.0 19.9 63.7 66.1 
Beverages (22) 19.9 21.2 9.6 10.0 20.5 21.7 5.4 6.0 19.4 20.3 19.9 21.1 5.1 7.1 
Tobacco (24) 17.1 18.5 9.5 10.0 17.6 18.6 5.3 6.0 17.3 18.1 16.4 17.5 11.0 30.8 
Source: MacMaps. 
 
It can be seen that the EU applies an average tariff of 20.2% on MERCOSUR 
agricultural produce. In the case of Bolivia the rate is 12.2%, and 16.0% for Chile. 
These two countries enjoy special treatment under the GSP Plus scheme because they 
have signed economic association agreements with the EU.  
             
Unlike the EU, the extended MERCOSUR countries apply tariffs that are 
below the level established at the WTO, and this gives them a ‘breathing space’ or 
margin in how they handle their tariff policy. On average, the MERCOSUR countries 
apply a tariff of just over 12% on agricultural produce, but Bolivia applies 10%. Until 
2005 Chile applied a lower tariff, a flat rate of 6% that was slightly changed by the 
price bands applied for wheat and sugar. However, even this level has been decreasing 
and must eventually reach zero because of the Chile-EU bilateral agreement. 
  
            It can be seen from the above that the European Union level of tariff 
protection for agricultural products is considerably higher (almost double) than the 
average protection applied by the extended MERCOSUR. This protection differential 
is much higher for some important products such as meat, dairy produce, cereals and 
sugar. 
 
            In addition to this, the EU applies specific and mixed tariffs to most products, 
which makes for higher levels of protection than the ad valorem tariffs applied by 
MERCOSUR because specific or mixed tariffs increase as a percentage of the entry 
price whenever prices go down. 
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c) Tariff Peaks 
 
            Average tariffs in the European Union are fairly moderate, but the bloc applies 
very high ‘tariff peaks’ for some specific agricultural products that are considered 
sensitive by European producers. For example, in the case of sugar the maximum 
tariff applied in 2005 was 244.7%, for meat it was 275.4%, for flour 222.4% and for 
dairy products 313% (a breakdown by sector of the tariff peaks applied by the EU is 
given in Annex 6).  
 
            The European Union applies lower tariff peaks to produce from Chile and 
Bolivia than those applied to the rest of the MERCOSUR countries. In the case of 
Chile this is because of the Chile-EU Economic Association Agreement, and for 
Bolivia it is because that country enjoys the benefits of GSP Plus.  
 
            In general the MERCOSUR countries do not apply high tariff peaks to restrict 
trade. Those that are in force are relatively moderate, they do not exceed 22% for 
certain items in the sugar and confectionary chapters (35% in the case of Paraguay), 
beverages (21.5%) and tobacco (21.5%). For further details see Annex 5. 
 
          To sum up, the extended MERCOSUR’s tariff protection is not only lower than 
the EU system, it also has a more homogeneous structure that does not involve such 
high tariff peaks. In the EU, these tariff peaks can be in the range of 200% to 500% 
(see Annex 6), and they affect products like sugar, meats, cereals and dairy products 
that are important for MERCOSUR exports. This situation makes for difficulties in 
the process of negotiating an association agreement.  
 
            It seems clear that the whole question of high EU tariff peaks is of 
fundamental importance in the inter-bloc bilateral agreement negotiations, and that the 
solution may well be in the area of adequate flexibility in the values of the quotas the 
EU grants MERCOSUR.  
 
d) Tariff escalation 
 
            Tariff escalation is the practice of levying higher customs duties on partially 
finished products than on raw materials, and even higher rates for finished products. 
This practice can provide significant protection for finished products, and the extent 
of this protection depends on the proportion of added value in the final product. 
 
            In general, the European Union applies higher tariffs to processed 
(intermediate and final) agricultural products, and in some cases these levels can be 
twice the rate for primary products. One exception is meat: this is mainly consumed in 
the form of fresh or frozen products, and a higher tariff is levied on the primary phase 
so as to protect European producers. An average of 45.9% is levied on meat as a 
primary product, whereas an average of 30.1% is levied on final meat products (for 
further details see Annex 8). 
 
            In the MERCOSUR, the tariffs on intermediate or final agricultural products 
that are imported from the European Union are higher than those levied on primary 
products. However, this tariff escalation is far lower than that applied by the EU to 
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MERCOSUR exports (for further details see Annex 7). Chile and Bolivia have no 
tariff escalation and they apply a flat rate of 6% and 10% respectively.   
 
            This seems to indicate that for an EU-MERCOSUR bilateral agreement to be 
successful, there must be greater flexibility on the part of the Europeans in the sphere 
of lowering tariffs on processed and intermediate products, and that the rates will have 
to fall towards base tariff levels. 
 
e) Variable tariffs and special regimes 
 
             Since GATT 94 became effective, the European Union has been applying the 
entry price system on fresh agricultural products. This system coves 15 products 
(tomatoes, cucumbers, Italian pumpkins, cherries, apricots, lemons, nectarines, plums, 
apples, pears, grapes, artichokes, clementines, mandarins and oranges) which are 
exported to European Union countries. 
 
            The entry price system consists of fixing a minimum import price (called the 
minimum entry price) for every batch of a particular product regardless of its country 
of origin. If the import value drops below the minimum entry price, the importer will 
have to pay an extra tax which is known as an equivalent tariff. This extra duty is 
additional to the normal import tax. When batches imported by the European Union 
drop below the 92% minimum import price (88% in the case of pears and apples for a 
certain period), the maximum equivalent customs duty is levied. 
 
            In the extended MERCOSUR, Argentina levies an additional tax on sugar and 
sugar products in line with the provisions of Decree 797/1992. In 2005 this amounted 
to a cost of 47.5 US dollars per ton. Chile has a system of price bands for wheat, 
wheat flour and sugar. This system is in the process of change to comply with a WTO 
ruling about this area. Since 2005 Chile has taken measures that apply to products 
with price bands, and these include tariff quotas,9 safeguards and anti-dumping 
measures. The other extended MERCOSUR countries have no variable or additional 
tariff system. 
 
          In the extended MERCOSUR the situation of special import regimes to support 
agriculture is as follows. In Bolivia, in accordance with Supreme Decree 27,971, 
imports of inputs and capital goods are exempt from tariffs. Brazil has a zero percent 
tariff rate for imports under heading 3105, heading 3102 (ammonium sulphate and 
urea) and heading 3103 (simple and triple super phosphate). Heading 3808 has 
variable tariffs ranging from zero to 14%. Chile also has a special regime for imports 
of capital goods consisting of fiscal credits at 4% interest for imports of new fixed 
assets. Uruguay has a zero percent tariff for imports of capital asset inputs. 
 
            It is clear that the extended MERCOSUR countries only make use of variable 
tariffs in very few cases, whereas in the EU this kind of protection is a traditional 
mechanism in agricultural trade policy to restrict market access. Although the EU has 
                                                 
9  In the case of Chile, in late 2003 a duty-free quota of 15,000 tons of sugar, distributed as follows: 12,000 metric 
tons annually from Bolivia, and 1,500 each from Costa Rica and El Salvador. These quotas were done away with 
in 2005. However, that same year they were re-established, with the following distribution: Bolivia 6,000 metric 
tons, Costa Rica and El Salvador 1,500 metric tons each, and 6,000 from any origin. If there was any excess 
requirement, authorisation was granted to import from any origin. 
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been gradually adjusting its variable tariffs in accordance with WTO rules, they are 
still in place for products that loom large among MERCOSUR agricultural exports, 
and are therefore a subject that has to be tackled in bilateral negotiations. The 
experience of removing this kind of tariff in other bilateral negotiations may well be a 
useful reference. 
             
4.1.2. Tariff Rate Quotas (TRQ) 
 
a) European Union and MERCOSUR Global Tariff Quotas 
 
            The European Union applies a broad system of tariff quotas. The chapters with 
the highest number of tariff quotas are meat, cereals, dairy products and sugar. For 
MERCOSUR agricultural products, tariff quotas are a key instrument for access to the 
European market because the main South American agricultural exports entering the 
EU market are subject to quotas, and the level of these quotas is one of the most 
delicate points in bilateral trade negotiations.  
 
            The following is a summary by chapter of the total amounts of EU quotas 
established at the WTO, and an indication of the extent to which they were actually 
used in 2004. In some chapters, the amount given as the quota actually used is higher 
than the quota allowed. This is because the EU deals in managed trade and the 
consolidated quotas function as the minimum level allowed for imports enjoying tariff 
preferences. However, the European countries can increase the amount of the quota in 
accordance with actual demand each year, which in effect is what they do. In the 
European Union approximately 61% of the total tariff quota established is made use 
of. 
 
CHART 8 
EU: TARIFF QUOTAS ESTABLISHED AT THE WTO, 
TOTAL QUOTA ACTUALLY USED AND PERCENTAGE OF USE, 2004 
Chapter Description 
TRQ 
permitted 
(Tm) 
TRQ 
used (Tm) 
Percentage of 
utilisation 
01 Live animals 8,837 191,444 2,166.4% 
02 Meat 852,318 296,413 34.8% 
04 Dairy products 309,640 373,637 120.7% 
06 Plants and flowers 25,493 37,544 147.3% 
07 Vegetables 2,953,298 6,564,698 222.3% 
08 Fruit 5,971,241 3,595,633 60.2% 
09 Coffee, tea and spices 528 206 39.0% 
10 Cereals 8,208,392 735,294 9.0% 
11 Products of the milling industry 44,816 20,002 44.6% 
15 Fats and oils 20,815 5,106 24.5% 
16 Meat preparations 9,285 12,406 133.6% 
17 Sugar and confectionery 3,674,116 1,659,302 45.2% 
18 Cocoa and preparations 28 2,500 8,928.6% 
19 Cereal preparations 5,199 3,401 65.4% 
20 Fruit and vegetable preparations 354,173 264,274 74.6% 
22 
Miscellaneous foodstuff 
preparations 20,446 85,000 415.7% 
23 By-products and waste 877,293 597,799 68.1% 
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TOTAL 23,335,918 14,444,659 61.9% 
Source: MacMaps. Note that this chart does not include EU imports effected outside the quota, and the 
data cover imports effected with tariffs in-quota. 
 
b) Specific EU quotas currently used by MERCOSUR and tariff rate quotas 
 
             The subject of European quotas for MERCOSUR products is complex, 
because it is closely linked to the multilateral negotiations taking place in the 
framework of the WTO. At the present time there are two kinds of quotas in the 
European Union that MERCOSUR countries can gain access to: 
 
i) Those designated erga omnes, i.e. not specific to any particular 
country. The MERCOSUR countries have to compete with other 
WTO member-countries to gain access to these. 
ii) Quotas specifically for MERCOSUR. 
 
             The following is a breakdown of products from MERCOSUR countries that 
currently enter the European Union under tariff quotas: 
 
• Beef 
 
            There are several quotas that depend on the quality of the beef and the country 
benefiting. Two are specific to MERCOSUR: one for 49,300 tons of high quality beef 
(the Hilton quota) and the other for 38,500 tons of frozen beef. There are other 
specific quotas such as those reserved for the ACP area (Africa, Caribbean and 
Pacific), and an erga omnes quota of 53,000 tons. 
 
CHART 9 
EU: AMOUNTS OF EUROPEAN BEEF QUOTAS 
FOR MERCOSUR 
 Hilton quota ™ Frozen meat quota ™ 
Argentina 38,000 6,000 
Brazil 5,000 28,100 
Uruguay 6,300 4,400 
Total 
MERCOSUR 
49,300 38,500 
   Source: European Commission. 
 
            Is should be noted that the MERCOSUR quotas are specific to each country 
and cannot be transferred from one to another. The tariffs applied in and over the 
quotas are fairly complex because they combine specific and ad valorem tariffs. In all 
cases these tariffs are heavy, and they severely limit access to the European market for 
products that are over the quota. 
 
CHART 10 
EU: TARIFFS IN AND OVER THE QUOTA 
FOR BEEF 
Products In-quota tariff Over quota 
Fresh or refrigerated boned 12.8% + 3034 €/ton 
Fresh or refrigerated in channels 12.8% + 1768 €/ton 
Frozen boned 12.8% + 2211 €/ton 
Frozen in channels 
20% 
12.8% + 1768 €/ton 
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                 Source: Export Helpdesk, European Commission. 
 
• Pork 
             
            European quotas for pork are small. The European Union grants a 72,600 ton 
erga omnes quota, and maintains a specific 11,000 ton quota for MERCOSUR. These 
volumes are low indeed in comparison to the 1.6 million tons imported by Europe in 
2006. 
 
           The tariffs applied are combined, as in the case of beef, one part being specific 
and the other ad valorem. 
 
 
CHART 11 
EU: TARIFFS IN AND OVER THE 
QUOTA FOR PORK 
 Specific tariffs Ad valorem 
 In-quota tariff Over quota In-quota tariff Over quota 
In channels 268€/ton 536€/ton 17.1% 34.3% 
Fresh or refrigerated pork 
cuts 233€ to 434€/ton 778€ to 869€/ton 22.5 to 30.8% 45.1 to 61.7% 
Shoulder and cuts 0% 467€ to 869€/ton 0% 27.9 to 40.4% 
Shoulder and boned ham 250€/ton 869€/ton 10.8% 40.4% 
Source: Export Helpdesk, European Commission 
 
• Chicken 
 
            The quotas for chicken granted by the European Union are also very limited. 
Of a total of 26,400 tons, some 7,100 are earmarked for Brazil. In addition, tariffs are 
high, even within the quota, as can be seen from the chart below: 
 
 
CHART 12 
EU: TARIFFS IN AND OVER THE  
QUOTA FOR CHICKEN 
Products In-quota tariff Over-quota tariff 
Frozen boned chicken cuts 
795 €/ton 1024 €/ton 
Fresh or refrigerated boned 
chicken cuts 
512 €/ton 1024 €/ton 
Source: Export Helpdesk, European Commission. 
 
            Brazil has enormous export capacity (2.1 million tons in 2004), and this is out 
of all proportion to the quota level. Of course, Brazil fills its quota completely and 
also exports over it, and so 90% of Brazil’s chicken exports to the European market 
are subject to the over-quota tariff10. 
 
                                                 
10  JANK, M. (coord.) 2004.  Fast tracking a ‘feasible’ EU-Mercosur Agreement: Scenarios for Untying the 
Agriculture Knot. 
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• Cereals 
 
            Most of the European quotas in this sector are erga omnes, i.e. open to all 
WTO member countries. The United States and Canada have specific quotas (572,000 
tons of medium and low-quality wheat for the U.S., and 38,000 tons for Canada), but 
MERCOSUR enjoys no such quotas. 
 
 
CHART 13 
EU-VOLUMES AND TARIFFS IN AND OVER 
QUOTAS FOR CEREALS 
Product Amount of quota In-quota tariff Over-quota tariff 
Maize 2.5 million tons erga omnes 45.2% 84.9% 
High quality wheat 300,000 tons erga omnes 0% 75.1% 
Medium and low quality 
wheat 
610,000 tons for USA and Canada 
2.37 million erga omnes 12 €/T 95 €/T 
Source: Export Heldesk, European Commission. 
 
 
• Sugar and Ethanol 
 
            The EU has a sugar quota of 1.8 million tons earmarked for countries in the 
ACP area, but MERCOSUR countries do not have access to this, and the question of 
establishing such a quota is not on the agenda in the negotiations for the Association 
Agreement. Nor does MERCOSUR currently have a European quota for ethanol. 
However, the 2004 European proposal includes a 1 million ton quota, which is of 
great interest to Brazil. 
 
 
• Dairy Products 
 
            At present the EU grants no quota for dairy products from MERCOSUR, 
whose share in European imports of these products is only 0.1%. The 2004 European 
proposal includes quotas of 3,000 tons for powdered milk, 5,000 tons for butter and 
20,000 tons for cheese. 
 
 
c) Some comparative observations on quotas 
 
            While the EU uses the concept of ‘managed trade’ as a key feature of its trade 
policy, particularly in the sphere of agriculture, the extended MERCOSUR countries 
do not apply this concept except in the quite exceptional case of some of the bloc’s 
member countries in the context of intraregional trade. For this reason, the 
MERCOSUR countries have not established tariff quotas at the WTO, and the quotas 
that are in force today in their trade are only those negotiated within the framework of 
bilateral preferential agreements, particularly intraregional agreements within the 
framework of ALADI. 
 
            Considering the importance the EU attaches to quotas, and that its tariffs, tariff 
peaks and tariff escalations are so high, it would seem clear that quotas should be 
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included in any bilateral agreement. The question is whether the quotas granted by the 
EU to MERCOSUR are to be a part of the global quotas already established or 
negotiated at the WTO, or whether they are to be additional to these. There is no 
doubt that MERCOSUR would rather have quotas that are additional to global quotas 
and would also rather be able to choose to use part of the global quotas in a 
framework of free competition. As this seems unlikely, the bloc’s main aim will be to 
obtain guaranteed adequate and high bilateral quotas in either of the two schemes: 
within the WTO or additional to the WTO. 
 
     
4.1.3. Rules of Origin 
 
The rules governing the origin of goods are a set of regulations established at the 
national level. They allow enterprises in countries with which some sort of tariff 
preference system is in place to know under what conditions their products may enter 
the other country while enjoying this tariff preference, i.e. rules governing origin 
make it possible to identify where the goods are from, not in terms of where they were 
shipped from but in terms of where they were actually produced. 
 
            In this context, the European Union has a system known as the Pan-European 
system, which is very complex and basically consists of different rules of origin for 
each tariff heading. The European Union has gradually established these different 
rules over time in the context of its various trade agreements. 
 
            This system is difficult to change in the framework of a trade agreement, 
because what the European Union wants is to maintain a standard set of rules of origin 
by product for all countries with which it makes trade agreements. 
 
            To find out what particular rule of origin a given product must comply with, a 
check must be made with the corresponding tariff heading as there is no general rule 
that applies to all agricultural products, for example.  
 
            An important element of flexibility in the European system is that a less 
advanced country can request a temporary exception to the EU rules of origin to allow 
its own industry to develop. 
 
            In extended MERCOSUR countries, the most common criteria in rules of 
origin are as follows: 
 
• Products must be totally obtained or made in MERCOSUR 
 
• The regional content of goods must be at least 60%, i.e. the value of 
intermediate products not of MERCOSUR origin must not be over 40% of 
the value of the finished product. 
 
            In addition, in trade agreements signed by the extended MERCOSUR, other 
criteria are taken into account, such as those covered by the De Minimis rules, the 
absorption principle and exceptions by process, as well as other items detailed in 
Annex 9. Likewise accumulation, be it bilateral or diagonal and worldwide, is 
allowed. 
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            Everything indicates that if an EU-MERCOSUR agreement were reached, the 
different criteria already used by both regions in trade agreements signed up to that 
time would be incorporated. The precedent of the EU-CHILE agreement might be 
used as a basis for the general criteria to be adopted. 
 
 
 
4.1.4. Non-Tariff Measures 
 
a) Antidumping measures, the application of general safeguard and 
compensatory measures. 
 
           Between 1995 and 2007 the European Union reported six cases of the 
application of antidumping measures on agricultural imports, and the MERCOSUR 
countries reported having applied such measures in ten cases, seven of which were in 
Brazil. 
 
            According to information from the WTO, of the total number of cases of 
antidumping measures applied against exporters of agricultural products in that 
period, two affected exports from the EU and 14 exports from extended MERCOSUR 
countries, mostly from Argentina and Chile. 
 
            Similarly, the extended MERCOSUR countries reported 10 cases in which 
general safeguard measures were applied against agricultural products in that period, 
and there were three instances when they themselves (as exporters of agricultural 
products) were subject to safeguard measures applied by other countries. The 
European Union applied general safeguards against the import of agricultural products 
only once during the period, and other countries took measures against EU exports in 
nine instances.  
 
CHART 14 
EXTENDED MERCOSUR-EU: CASES IN WHICH ANTIDUMPING 
MEASURES, GENERAL SAFEGUARD MEASURES AND COMPENSATORY 
RIGHTS WERE APPLIED AGAINST AGRICULTURAL AND 
AGROINDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS (A) 1995-2007 
 Antidumping measures Safeguard measures Compensatory measures 
Country Reporting 
country 
Exporting 
country 
Reporting 
country 
Exporting 
country 
Reporting 
country 
Exporting 
country 
Argentina 1 5 4 3 13 25 
Brazil 7 3 5 0 15 23 
Chile 2 5 no report no report 7 no report 
Paraguay 0 0 no report no report no report no report 
Uruguay 0 1 no report no report no report no report 
Extended 
MERCOSUR 
10 14 9 3 35 3 
European 
Union 6 2 
1 9 1 0 
Source: WTO. Includes measures applied in sections I to IV in the nomenclature of WTO reports, i.e.: I. Live 
animals and animal products; II. Vegetable products; III. Animal or vegetable fats and oils; derived products; 
manufactured food fats; animal or vegetable wax, and IV: Products from the food industry; beverages, alcoholic 
liquids and vinegar; tobacco and manufactured tobacco substitutes. 
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            In some specific cases countries in the extended MERCOSUR have applied 
antidumping measures. In late 2006 Chile imposed a 16.2% provisional antidumping 
surcharge on imports of wheat flour from Argentina, classified under tariff code 
1101.0000 in the National Customs Tariffs. This was changed in 2007, and a new 
provisional antidumping surcharge of 33.1% was established. 
 
            In 2005 Argentina applied antidumping measures against imports of wheat 
gluten and peach syrup from the EU, and Brazil levied antidumping surcharges for 
ammonium nitrate, glysophate, powdered milk, garlic, preserved mushrooms, jute 
sacks and peaches in syrup. In this case the imports in question were mostly from 
Asian countries and the European Union. Uruguay has also used this measure, against 
edible oil from Argentina. 
 
           Between 1995 and 2007, the European Union applied special agricultural 
safeguards against more than 50 products. Measures applied as a result of the fall in 
prices affected exports to the EU of some chicken and beef preparations and also 
sugar. The measures based on the increase in import volumes particularly affected 
exports of fruit to the EU (oranges, citrus fruit, apples, pears, plums) and vegetables 
(tomatoes, cucumbers, pumpkins).  
 
         The MERCOSUR countries did not use this instrument for protection, mainly 
because most of them had not included it on their lists of commitments in the Final 
Agreement of the Uruguay Round, which was an indispensable condition to be able to 
make use of these measures. 
 
             In February 2005, Chile imposed a 17% ad valorem extra tariff duty on wheat 
flour (heading 1101.0000 of the National Customs Tariffs) as a definitive safeguard 
measure. Excluded from this was wheat flour with a c.i.f. price of over USD 0.3/net 
kilo that satisfied specified quality characteristics. Imports of this product from 
Mexico, Canada and Peru were also exempt because of prevailing trade agreements 
with these countries. Developing countries that were WTO members with an 
individual market share of less than 3% were also exempt. In October 2005 a change 
was introduced whereby the extra duty was not levied on imports of wheat flour up to 
1,944 tons, but quantities above this amount were liable to the new charge.   
 
            In Argentina, a safeguard measure was applied against preserved peaches, 
with an extra duty of USD 0.50 /kilo net, but this was later reduced to USD 0.40/kilo 
net. Excluded from this measure were products from MERCOSUR countries and 
South Africa. The value of imports affected by the measure is reckoned to be over one 
million US dollars. 
 
            In general the use of antidumping measures does not seem to be an obstacle to 
the development of trade between the EU and MERCOSUR in the framework of an 
agreement between the two blocs, even though the instrument is available and has 
been used by both. 
 
 
            b) Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 
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            In recent years consumers have somewhat lost confidence in foodstuff safety 
as a result of some food-related health crises. To confront this problem, the European 
Union is applying a global strategy aimed at re-establishing public confidence in 
foodstuffs ‘from the farm to the table’, based on a combination of foodstuff, 
zoosanitary and phytosanitary standards that are applicable to EU-produced and also 
to imported foodstuffs. 
 
          This strategy rests on three pillars:   
 
• Legislation on foodstuffs and feed. 
 
• Solid scientific advice to base decisions upon. 
 
• Effective application and controls.  
 
Imports of products of vegetable origin must comply with certain general conditions 
and specific requirements that have been established to avoid risks to public health, to 
preserve the vegetables and to protect consumers. Vegetable products must comply 
with standards governing foodstuff safety, phytosanitary aspects, labelling and 
quality. 
 
            These standards are set down in community directives and rules. The former 
define objectives but leave each country free to choose how to comply with them in 
their national legislation. The rules are obligatory in full, and automatically become 
effective in all countries on the date established.11  
 
            In the case of products of animal origin, the matter of traceability of 
foodstuffs, feed, animals for the production of food and any other substance added to 
food must be established throughout all the stages of production, transformation and 
distribution. That is to say, every enterprise must be able to identify not only its 
suppliers but also the entities it has supplied. In the European context, the objective of 
the rules is to take ‘one step back and one step forwards’. 
            
The extended MERCOSUR countries have stated that they apply only the 
measures necessary to preserve the country’s sanitary status and that there are no 
common sets of rules for the region. They do, however, have two mechanisms for 
regional coordination, both of which depend on the CAS forum of Ministers of 
Agriculture: 
 
• The Permanent Veterinary Committee (CVP - Comité Veterinario 
Permanente), which is made up of the National Directors of Animal Health of 
the six CAS countries, and which is recognised by the World Organization for 
Animal Health (OIE) and the regional animal health reference body.  
                                                 
11  In the following hyperlinks in the EU website, information is available on established sanitary and 
phytosanitary matters: 
• Phytosanitary protection: http://ec.europa.eu/food/plant/index_en.htm 
• Food safety: http://ec.europa.eu/food/food/index_en.htm 
• Summary of legislations: http://europa.eu.scadplus/leg/es/s80000.htm. 
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• The Committee for Plant Heath for the Southern Cone (COSAVE), made up of 
the National Directors of Vegetable Health of the six CAS countries, with 
regional legal status to dictate sanitary standards in this area. 
 
The six countries attach great importance to strengthening sanitary services 
and preserving and improving the region’s sanitary status, and coordinated efforts are 
made to eradicate, control and/or prevent (depending on the situation in each country) 
fruit fly, foot and mouth disease, bird flu, cotton blight, bovine spongiform 
encephalopathy (BSE), citrus canker, soya bean blight and other plagues and pests.  
 
            All the MERCOSUR countries have been implementing and improving their 
traceability systems, particularly in the case of cattle, and making joint efforts to 
progress towards a regional traceability system. 
 
 
d) Technical and Labelling Standards 
 
            Rules regarding the labelling, presentation and advertising of foodstuffs sold 
in the EU are laid down in Directive 2000/13/CE. This Directive covers wrapped, 
packaged and tinned foodstuff for delivery without further transformation to the final 
consumer, restaurants, hospitals and other similar entities. 
 
            The aim is that the labelling, presentation and advertising of foodstuffs should 
not to lead consumers into errors as regards the product’s characteristics or effects. 
 
            Foodstuff labels must include mandatory information such as sales 
denomination, list of ingredients (it is not necessary to indicate the ingredients for 
some products including fresh fruit and vegetables), the product’s expiry date and its 
storage and preservation conditions. This essential information must be on the original 
wrapping or an attached label. When wrapped, packaged or tinned foodstuffs are sold 
in phases prior to sale to the final consumer, or are to be delivered for subsequent 
preparation, the information may be given just in the commercial documentation, so 
long as the sale denomination, minimum expiry date and data about the manufacturer 
or enterprise responsible for wrapping, packaging or canning appears on the external 
wrapping, packaging or tin can containing the foodstuff in question. 
 
            In the EU there are also foodstuff quality stamps that indicate quality 
characteristics that exceed the basic health and safety requirements. These quality 
characteristics are known as differentiating quality emblems, and there are voluntary 
control systems to guarantee that a foodstuff does actually possess one or more of 
these characteristics. 
 
            These systems usually consist of an independent entity (usually called a 
certifying body) verifying and checking that the product actually possesses the value 
attributes shown. The visible sign that the product has been checked is a quality 
indication stamp, symbol or logotype on the label. Three kinds of quality stamps are 
in use: Denomination of Origin and Protected Geographic Indication; Guaranteed 
Traditional Specialty; and Organic Production. 
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            In 1991 the European Union established rules governing ecological 
agricultural production and how this is shown for agricultural products, and in 1999 
the ecological breeding of animals was included. These rules establish a standard 
basis for being classified as organic, and give the consumer a guarantee that the 
product qualifies for this denomination.  
 
           The standards employed for ecological agriculture and breeding require an 
accredited public certifying body or a private control body that is recognised in each 
member state to check that a product actually has been produced under conditions that 
comply with the European Union requirements in question. 
 
            In the extended MERCOSUR the main certification instruments are basically 
certification of origin, certification of quality, sanitary certification and, in the case of 
Brazil, certification as an organic product.  
 
            In Argentina labelling policies are regulated by Law 18,284, which establishes 
labelling requirements for foodstuffs. The aim is to provide consumers with the 
clearest and most relevant information possible about the food to be consumed.  
 
            In Bolivia, the National Identification of Ecological Products stamp certifies 
the quality of the product and guarantees it. In Brazil the policy is that all foodstuffs 
sold in the market, no matter what their origin, must be suitably labelled. 
 
            Paraguay has a set of rules covering the wrapping, packaging or tin can, and 
the marking of fruit and vegetables. For genetically modified organisms, which are 
not forbidden in that country, all marking and labelling requirements must be 
complied with. Lastly, in Uruguay the rules established by MERCOSUR are in force. 
 
            d)   Some comparative observations about tariff measures 
             
            The European systems of labelling, quality, sanitary control and traceability 
are stricter than the world average and those used in MERCOSUR, and these 
instruments are a factor that may restrict MERCOSUR exports to the EU or at least 
reduce their margins of competitiveness. This is because compliance with European 
standards would mean that production and sales costs for MERCOSUR agricultural 
exporters would increase, even though these enterprises are already taking measures 
to align their export systems with the standards in question. 
 
            One way of tackling this difficulty in bilateral negotiation is through joint 
investment, whereby European investors could contribute to solving this problem. 
Another is through bilateral EU-MERCOSUR cooperation on these points, thus 
extending what has already been initiated in the EU regional cooperation project with 
MERCOSUR in the field of agricultural product safety. 
 
 
4.2 Subsidies and taxes on exports 
 
European community subsidies are granted at the community level, i.e. the payments 
come from the community budget as well as from the member states. In 
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MERCOSUR, on the other hand, this kind of subsidy is supposed to be defined, 
financed and applied by each country individually, but in fact no subsidies are being 
paid at the present time. 
 
4.2.1. Taxes on exports  
 
In the EU member countries, no taxes of any kind are levied on exports. 
 
            Among MERCOSUR countries, Argentina recently increased taxes on 
exports. As a general rule a 5% rate is applied in the case of industrialised products, 
10% on non-industrialised items and 20% on cereals and oilseed and their derived 
products.  
 
            Bolivia, Chile and Paraguay do not apply any form of tax on exports. In 
Brazil, on the other hand, there is an export tax on furs and hides, and Uruguay taxes 
exported unprocessed cattle and sheep hides at 5%. 
 
 
4.2.2. Export Subsidies 
 
a) Subsidies established at the WTO 
 
            In the framework of the final agreement reached in the Uruguay Round, 
countries established their export subsidies and made a commitment to reduce 
associated budgetary outlay by 36% (developed countries) or 24% (developing 
countries) until the end of the reform period (2000/2001). 
 
            This means a reduction of almost 5 thousand million US dollars on the part of 
the EU, which made a commitment not to exceed 8,500 million US dollars per annum 
in export subsidies as of 2001. These subsidies, however, are concentrated in products 
that are important to MERCOSUR such as beef, cereals and dairy products. 
 
In addition, should the Doha Round close successfully, the commitment 
already made in current negotiations would be established, and export subsidies 
would be completely eliminated by 2013. This deadline was proposed by the EU 
itself. 
 
            In the MERCOSUR, only Brazil and Uruguay (the latter almost symbolically) 
established export subsidies in the Uruguay Round, and only for tiny amounts 
compared to EU subsidy levels. 
 
CHART 15 
EXTENDED MERCOSUR-EU: COMMITMENTS TO REDUCE EXPORT 
SUBSIDIES ESTABLISHED AT THE WTO, 1995 
Country Base (mill USD) 
Final 
(mill USD) Reduction % 
Composition of products covered 
by subsidies 
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European 
Union 13,274 8,496 36 
Beef 19%, wheat 17%, butter 13%, 
secondary cereals 13%, other dairy 
products 10% 
Brazil 96 73 24 Sugar 56%, fruit, green vegetables and vegetables 23% 
Uruguay 2 1 23 Rice 83%, butter 12% 
 Source: ECLAC 
 
 
b) Subsidies applied to exports 
 
            The EU has been exercising its right, which was established at the WTO, to 
subsidise exports through a mechanism called ‘refunds’, whereby any European 
exporter receives a subsidy to compensate for the gap between the European price and 
the price that could be obtained on the world market. 
 
            In the 1980s, when domestic European prices were far higher than 
international prices, refunds were high: they amounted to over 12 thousand million 
euros in the late 1980s. Progressive reductions in European prices after the 1992, 1999 
and 2003 reforms have automatically reduced refunds. As can be seen in Figure 3, 
refunds fell from 12 thousand million euros in the early 1990s to under 2.5 thousand 
million euros in 2006. 
 
FIGURE 3 
EU: TOTAL VALUES OF EXPORT REFUNDS 
1990-2006 
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                            Source: Aerostato 
 
TEXT  
miles de millones de euros = thousand million euros 
años = years 
 
            The relative importance of the different kinds of products qualifying for 
refunds has changed over time in line with the evolution of domestic and international 
prices. 
 
• Cereals were the product receiving the most export subsidies in the 1990s, but 
this was no longer the case at the end of that decade because domestic prices 
 43
fell after the 1992 and 1999 reforms. In 2005, refunds for this product 
amounted to 131 million euros and accounted for 4% of total refunds. 
 
• In recent years, dairy products and sugar accounted for 70% of total refunds. 
However, there has been a considerable fall in refunds for dairy products, from 
1,495 million euros in 2004 to 725 million in 2006. In 2006, sugar became the 
most subsidised export product, with refunds of 1,117 million euros. 
 
 
• Animal products account for only a small part of total refunds and the trend is 
for refunds in this sector to decrease. Refunds for beef dropped from 251 
million euros in 2004 to 118 million in 2006. In the same period, refunds for 
chicken decreased from 88 to 61 million, and refunds for pork fell from 42 to 
19 million euros. 
 
CHART 16 
BREAKDOWN OF REFUNDS BY PRODUCT TYPE IN MILLIONS OF 
EUROS AND AS PERCENTAGES, 2004-2006 
2004 2005 2006 Type of product Amount  % Amount % Amount % 
Dairy products 1,495 44 % 1,141 37 % 725 29 % 
Sugar 988 29 % 1,081 35 % 1,117 45 % 
Beef 251 7 % 212 7 % 118 5 % 
Cereals (including rice) 95 3 % 131 4 % 129 5 % 
Chicken 88 3 % 87 3 % 61 2 % 
Fruit and vegetables 26 0.8 % 25 0.8 % 26 1 % 
Pork 42 1.2 % 19 0.6 % 19 0.8 % 
Wine 13 0.4 % 17 0.5 % 19 0.8 % 
Other products not in Annex 1 380 11 % 335 11 % 274 11 % 
TOTAL 3,384 100 % 3,052 100 % 2,494 100 
% 
    Source: Notification to the WTO about subsidies and compensatory measures (G/SCM/N/155/EEC) 
 
 
            In June 2007, the EU decided to abolish refunds for dairy products and sugar 
and keep them only for cereals, beef and wine, which means a considerable additional 
reduction in refunds. It is expected that they will amount to less than one thousand 
million euros in 2008. 
 
FIGURE 4 
EU: AMOUNTS OF REFUNDS FOR MAIN PRODUCTS 2004-2006 
(million euros) 
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Source: Notification to the WTO about subsidies and compensatory measures (G/SCM/N/155/EEC) 
 
TEXT 
millones de euros = million euros 
Otros productos fuera del anexo 1 = Other products not in Annex 1 
Carne bovina = Beef 
Azúcar = Sugar 
Productos lácteos = Dairy products 
 
            In MERCOSUR no subsidies are paid for export products, not even by Brazil 
or Uruguay, who stated, however, that they did have them and had established them at 
the Uruguay Round. In fact the situation is quite the reverse: not only are there no 
subsidies but Argentina actually levies taxes on exports instead of subsidising them 
(for almost all its agricultural exports), Brazil does this partially (for tobacco and 
hides) and Uruguay taxes exports of unprocessed hides. In all cases, this negatively 
affects the products’ international competitiveness. 
 
c) Some comparative observations 
 
           A comparative analysis of policies shows clear differences in how exports are 
treated. While Europeans support their exports through refunds, some MERCOSUR 
countries restrict theirs with taxes. This dramatic difference between the two blocs 
still exists, despite the progressive drop in European refunds. This situation does not 
affect bilateral trade relations (agricultural exports from the EU to MERCOSUR have 
always been very limited, even though in the past refunds were high) as much as it 
affects the competitiveness of European and of MERCOSUR exports in third markets. 
 
            The best chance for a solution to this problem would be a successful outcome 
at the Doha Round, and compliance with the commitments made at the WTO 
ministerial meeting in Hong Kong to abolish all export subsidies by 2013. 
 
d) Institutionality and export promotion policies in the extended 
MERCOSUR 
 
             In all the MERCOSUR countries there are public sector special programmes 
and organisations that operate in close contact with the private sector to promote the 
development of exports. These specialised organisations do not constitute subsidies. 
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            These institutions include Fundación Exportar in Argentina, a mixed body 
with public and private sector participation, which assists the entrepreneurial 
community in their efforts to sell their products effectively at the international level, 
the aim being to gain access for their exports and to widen and diversify their offer. 
 
           In Bolivia two of the organizations that help promote exports and attract 
investment are the Bolivian Institute for Foreign Trade (IBCE - Instituto Boliviano de 
Comercio Exterior) and the BOLIVIA Promotion Centre (CEPROBOL - Centro de 
Promoción BOLIVIA), which is the operational branch of the Ministry of Foreign 
Relations and Cults, geared to promoting exports and attracting investment. Their 
objectives are: 
 
a) To contribute to improving the business climate and the country’s image. 
b) To increase and diversify the flow of international trade, with an emphasis on 
exports with added value. 
c) To foster and attract investment in production and service sectors. 
d) To generate strategic alliances and favour the internationalisation of the 
productive and entrepreneurial sector. 
 
In Brazil, the Agency for the Promotion of Exports and Investment (APEX) is 
an autonomous institute under the auspices of the Ministry of Development, Industry 
and Foreign Trade. It was set up in early 2003 with specialised management from 
SEBRE (the Brazilian Service for Assistance to Micro and Small Enterprises), and its 
goal is to stimulate Brazilian exports. In addition, there are three important public 
programmes: a) the ‘Estado Exportador’ (‘Exporting State’) which works on 
improving the competitiveness of Brazilian states that export less than 100 million 
dollars per annum; b) the promotion of micro, small and medium enterprise exports to 
Japan through training in selected sectors, a programme supported by JICA (the Japan 
International Cooperation Agency); and c) the Export Portal, which offers a 
communication channel for suggestions, queries and consultations. 
 
            In Chile, the Ministry of Foreign Relations has a specialised institute called 
PROCHILE, which helps the entrepreneurial sector to take advantage of opportunities 
stemming from trade agreements, promotes public and private sector cooperation and 
improves the positioning of the country’s image in other markets. This organization 
has a network of offices throughout Chile and the main world markets. 
 
            In Paraguay, there is the ProParaguay Institute (the General Directorate for the 
Promotion of Exports and Investment in Paraguay), which comes under the auspices 
of the Ministry of Foreign Relations. This body was set up in October 1991, and its 
goals are to promote the export of non-traditional Paraguayan products and foster 
national and foreign investment that contributes to the country’s economic 
development. ProParaguay has three directorates to carry out its functions and 
services: Export Promotion, Investment Promotion, and Trade Information. In 
addition, the Ministry of Industry and Trade has set up a special programme called 
‘Ventanilla Única’ which centralises all the necessary information about bureaucratic 
procedures for exporting.  Besides this, the Investment and Export Network (REDIEX 
- Red de Inversiones y Exportaciones) coordinates related private and public efforts.  
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          In Uruguay there are four organisations involved in export promotion. Two are 
public bodies devoted to the general promotion of exports, and the other two are more 
specifically responsible for promotion by sector. The four organisations are: 
 
a. Uruguay XXI, the Institute for the Promotion of Investment and 
Exports of Goods and Services, whose goal is to position Uruguay 
in the new context of the international economy. 
b. The Directorate of Trade Programming (DPC - Dirección de 
Programación Comercial), which is an organ of the Ministry of 
Foreign Relations and organises all kinds of trade fairs and trade 
information required by enterprises in order to gain access to 
international markets. 
c. The Farm Retraining and Development Programme (Programa de 
Reconversión y Desarrollo de la Granja), which is responsible for 
promoting farm sub-sector exports by enhancing enterprises’ 
competitiveness and increasing the value of farm production. 
d. The National Institute for Viticulture (INAVI - Instituto Nacional 
de Vitivinicultura) which collaborates in the improvement of 
winemaking enterprises through the technological redevelopment 
of raw material. 
 
 
4.3. Domestic Assistance for Agriculture 
 
Domestic assistance for agriculture is no longer an instrument for governments’ 
discretionary policies. Since the time when its direct or indirect influence on trade and 
international prices was recognised internationally, this kind of assistance has become 
part of analysed policies and is declared and negotiated in the framework of the World 
Trade Organisation. As a result, analysis and the effort to reach agreement on the 
possible effects on agriculture have become part of all international trade negotiations.  
  
 
4.3.1. Global levels of support for agriculture 
 
OECD’s Producer Support Estimate (PSE) for 2002-2004 shows that in Europe more 
than one third of agricultural producers’ incomes comes from outside support (from 
the state and from consumers), whereas in the extended MERCOSUR this kind of 
support amounts to less than 5% of income. In other words, European agricultural 
producers receive ten times more support than do farmers in the MERCOSUR 
countries for which this calculation has been made. 
 
          In fact, estimates for Brazil (2002-2004 average) and Chile (2003-2005) show 
that these two countries’ support for production is substantially less than that 
implemented in the rest of the OECD countries and in the European Union. When we 
bear in mind that Brazil and Chile are the countries in the region with the greatest 
public spending on agriculture, it is clear from the above that there is considerable 
asymmetry between government support for agriculture in the EU on the one hand 
and MERCOSUR on the other. 
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FIGURE 5 
ESTIMATED SUPPORT FOR PRODUCERS AS A PERCENTAGE OF 
GROSS INCOME AT THE FARM LEVEL. 2002-2004 AVERAGE* 
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Source: OECD Review of Agricultural Policies. Brazil and Chile, 2005 and 2008 respectively. 
*With the exception of Chile, whose average covers 2003-2005. 
TEXT 
Porcientos = Percentages 
N. Zelanda = N. Zealand 
Brasil = Brazil 
Autralia = Australia 
Rusia = Russia 
EEUU = USA 
México = Mexico 
Canadá = Canada 
Japón = Japan 
 
 
4.3.2. The European Union 
 
Domestic support for European agriculture is included in the Common Agricultural 
Policy, as are export subsidies. The figures below for the European Union include 
both kinds of support. 
 
            The global budget of the CAP is programmed in six-year periods, and 
effective execution of these budgets varies very little with respect to what was 
programmed initially. In 1999 the budget for 2000-2006 was decided, and the budget 
for 2007-2013 was decided in 2006. 
 
FIGURE 6 
EU: COMMITMENTS TO REDUCE DOMESTIC SUPPORT 1995-2000 
(thousand million US dollars) 
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  Source: European Economic Commission 
 
            The annual budget for the CAP rose from 42.1 thousand million euros in 2001 
to 49.9 thousand million in 2006 (see Figure 7). This 18.5% increase over five years 
was due mainly to the incorporation of ten new member countries into the EU on 1 
April 2004, and the corresponding increase in population from 389 million inhabitants 
(EU-15) to 463 million (EU-25), a 19% rise. Taking this perimetric change into 
account, the CAP budget per capita has remained constant in recent years. 
 
FIGURE 7 
EU: CAP GLOBAL ANNUAL BUDGET, 2001-2006 
(thousand million euros)  
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Source: European Economic Commission, Staff Working Document, 2005 financial year. 
 
         
TEXT 
miles de millones de euros = thousand million euros 
años = years 
 
The CAP budget can be broken down into two parts. The larger, which is 
called the first pillar, covers intervention in markets and accounts for 86% of the total, 
and the second pillar covers rural development expenditure and accounts for the 
remaining 14%. 
 
FIGURE 8 
EU: BREAKDOWN OF BUDGET BY TYPE OF MEASURES, 2005 
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Source: EU Commission Staff Working Document, 2005 financial year. 
 
TEXT 
Otras medidas = Other measures 9.20% 
Desarrollo rural = Rural development 13.90% 
Restituciones = Refunds 6.20% 
Almacenamiento = Storage 1.70% 
Ayudas directas = Direct support 68.90% 
 
First CAP pillar 
 
In 2005, assistance under the first pillar amounted to 42.1 thousand million euros, 
equivalent to 86% of the total CAP budget. It is worth noting that with 3.05 thousand 
million euros in refunds, export subsidies amounted to 6.2% of the CAP budget. 
 
            The most important mechanism in the first pillar is direct assistance for 
producers’ incomes, which in 2005 came to 33.7 thousand million euros. This 
assistance has been increasing progressively, in line with decreases in guaranteed 
prices. Until 2005 this assistance was linked to production activity and was 
administered by different Common Market Organisations (COM). In 2005 most 
assistance was transferred to the new Single Payment Scheme (SPS) whereby every 
producer receives a single annual payment that is not linked to what is produced, and 
is reckoned on the basis of payments received during the reference period of previous 
years. 
 
            The main goal of the single payment, besides becoming a green box type of 
assistance, is to guarantee producers a more stable income. They can decide what they 
want to produce as they know that the amount they receive will be the same regardless 
of what they produce, which allows them to adapt to demand. 
 
            Besides the single payment, agricultural producers can benefit from other 
special assistance schemes for certain crops (protein crops, rice, cotton, tobacco, 
olives and leguminous grains). The change in the mechanism for the distribution of 
direct assistance did not affect volumes. Direct assistance for 2006, the first year the 
new mechanism was applied, amounted to 34.05 thousand million euros, as against 
33.7 thousand million the previous year. Direct assistance makes an important 
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contribution to European producers’ incomes: in 2005 it accounted for 54% of their 
total income. 
 
          The right to the single annual payment is linked to the requirement that 
producers manage their operations in a sustainable manner. To benefit from the single 
payment scheme or other direct payments, it is not necessary for producers to actually 
produce, but they must comply with conditioning standards on a twofold basis: (i) 
good agricultural and environmental conditions and (ii) legal management 
requirements. Non-compliance with these conditions can lead to the reduction or 
complete discontinuation of direct payments.  
 
            Direct assistance has come in for criticism in the EU itself, and one of the 
most important complaints is that the distribution of this assistance is rather unequal 
among the EU member states and among European producers: 
 
• At the country level: 5% of the member-countries receive 75% of direct 
assistance (France 22%, Germany 15%, Italy 13%, Great Britain 12% and 
Spain 11%). 
 
• Ten percent of farms receive more than 20,000 euros each and thus receive 
56% of total direct assistance. On the other hand, 60% of farms receive less 
than 5,000 euros each, and thus enjoy only 10% of the assistance.  
 
Storage 
 
           Over the last 15 years, CAP expenditure on storage has followed the same 
downward trend as refunds, and for the same reasons. High prices in the 1990s 
provided an incentive for production and this gave rise to a sizeable surplus which not 
only needed refunds to be able to sell in the world market but also required storage 
facilities. Guaranteed prices have gradually decreased and been changed into direct 
assistance, which has greatly reduced surpluses and thus storage costs. This 
expenditure, which accounted for 10% of the global CAP budget in the early 1990s, 
dropped to 2.5% of the CAP budget in 2001 and to 1.7% (equivalent to 850 million 
euros) in 2005. 
 
The Second CAP Pillar: Rural Development. 
 
            In 2005, rural development measures came to 6.82 thousand million euros, 
which was 13.9% of the global CAP budget. It should be noted that the amount of 
funds spent on this second pillar is growing at a faster rate than the total CAP budget. 
Thus, the relative weight of rural development in the CAP has been increasing every 
year since the 1990s. This second pillar accounted for 10.3 % of the CAP budget in 
2001, 13.9% in 2005, and 15.4% in 2006. 
 
          There are 22 specific measures that member countries can include in their 
national rural development programmes. These measures are organised into three 
broad categories: 
 
• Category 1: Measures for restructuring and for fostering competitiveness. 
These include support for young people to set themselves up, for pensions for 
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the elderly, for soil improvement, for development and improvements to 
facilities, and for marketing high quality products. In 2005, measures in this 
category accounted for 52% of the total funds of the second pillar. 
 
• Category 2: Environmental management.  This includes measures to protect 
the environment, reforestation, and support for disadvantaged areas. In 2005, 
measures in this category accounted for 38% of second pillar funds. 
 
• Category 3. Measures for land organization. These include projects to develop 
villages and hamlets, services for the rural population, and fostering rural 
tourism. In 2005, measures in this category accounted for 10% of second pillar 
funds. 
 
CHART 17 
EU: BREAKDOWN OF CAP BUDGET BY PRODUCT, 2005 
 Amounts in million euros Relative weight 
Vegetable production 29,134 68.0 % 
Cereals and other herbaceous crops 17,836 41.6 % 
Olive oil 2,297 5.4 % 
Fruit and vegetables 1,814 4.2 % 
Sugar 1,770 4.1 % 
Direct horizontal assistance 1,388 3.2 % 
Winemaking sector 1,228 2.9 % 
Tobacco 929 2.2 % 
Cotton and textile plants 913 2.2 % 
Food support programmes 223 0.5 % 
Other vegetable products 737 1.7 % 
Animal production  13,684 32.0 % 
Beef 7,888 18.4 % 
Milk and dairy products 3,804 8.9 % 
Sheep and goat meat 1,794 4.2 % 
Pork, eggs and poultry, beekeeping and others 197 0.5 % 
TOTAL 42,818 100 % 
Source: European Economic Commission. 
 
 
            The above chart shows all funds allocated to each product category, whatever 
the expenditure mechanism may be, so it includes refunds (export subsidies) where 
applicable. Note that the weight of different mechanisms varies greatly according to 
the product in question. 
 
• In the case of cereals and other herbaceous crops, most of the 17,836 million 
euros are for direct payments. Refunds account for only 131 million of this 
total, and expenditure on storage accounts for another 444 million. Assistance 
for olive oil is granted only as a direct payment. 
 
• In the case of sugar, the situation is quite the reverse. Of the 1,770 million 
euros allocated to this product, the larger share (1,080 million) goes on 
refunds, and a further 232 million is for storage costs. The policy of paying the 
producer high prices is basically financed by the consumer, and these funds do 
not come out of the CAP budget. 
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4.3.3. The Extended MERCOSUR 
 
In the extended MERCOSUR, the only country that has made a commitment to 
reduce domestic assistance for agriculture is Brazil. As part of the so called ‘amber 
box’ programmes, expenditure in this area was gradually reduced from 1,050 million 
US dollars to just under 900 million over the 1995-2004 period 
 
            The lack of a common agricultural policy somewhat hampers a comparison 
between the EU and MERCOSUR agricultural policies. Nevertheless, one form of 
measurement that can facilitate a comparison is to consider the relation between 
public expenditure in the agricultural sector (for which there are some figures for the 
extended MERCOSUR) and sectorial GDP. 
 
FIGURE 9 
BRAZIL: COMMITMENTS TO REDUCE DOMESTIC SUPPORT, 1995-2004 
(million US dollars) 
 
Source: OECD 
 
 
            As can be seen in Chart 18, these costs fluctuate a lot between countries in 
the region. In 2005, expenditure of this kind in Chile was equivalent to 9.9% of 
agricultural GDP, and this made Chile the country with the highest public agricultural 
expenditure as a proportion of sectorial GDP. Next on the list came Uruguay with 8%, 
Bolivia with 4.8%, and the country with the lowest rate was Paraguay with 2.1%. 
Note that in some countries the proportion of agricultural public spending is very low 
(3% in Argentina and 2.67% in Brazil), which no doubt reflects the fact that the sector 
is very competitive. However, it should be born in mind that the Chart does not take 
into account assistance at the province or state level in Argentina and Brazil.  
 
CHART 18 
EXTENDED MERCOSUR: PUBLIC AGRICULTURAL SPENDING, 2005 
(million US dollars) 
Agricultural public expenditure 
policy Argentina Bolivia Brazil Chile Paraguay Uruguay 
1. Public expenditure on promoting 
production  378.02 54.84 892.36 372.90 12.49 34.88 
  a. Horizontal production 
promotion 228.83 27.49 339.22 181.00 9.87 21.28 
  b. Localised production promotion 149.19 27.35 553.14 191.90 2.62 13.60 
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2. Infrastructure 75.35 8.48 637.02 
no 
data  10.52 94.57 
  a. Agriculture infrastructure works 67.00 8.48 637.02 
no 
data  10.52  94.57 
  b. Energy 8.35 
no 
data  no data  
 no 
data      
3. Rural social spending 22.53 
no 
data  71.50 282.90  8.25 125.76 
4. Total expenditure on 
agriculture 475.90 63.32 1600.88 655.80 31.26 255.21 
Agricultural expenditure / GDP 
(%)*  3.00 4.80 2.67 9.92 2.12 8 
Source: REDPA, Policy Matrix, 2005. 
 
          In most of these countries a large portion of this expenditure goes to foster 
production, but in Uruguay social expenditure is the most important item followed by 
expenditure on facilities, and expenditure allocated to fostering production is in third 
place. 
 
            Chart 18 and Annexes 22, 23 and 24, give a more detailed picture of the 
agricultural policy instruments this expenditure is allocated to. 
 
It can be seen in Annex 23 that most of the productive units in Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile and Uruguay are less than 50 hectares in size, and there are processes of 
concentration of land in all these countries. Nevertheless, Argentina and Uruguay 
have a more balanced distribution of land, while in Chile and Brazil there is a high 
degree of concentration with a very low percentage of proprietors owning the larger 
areas, and a large number of smallholders. In Bolivia the situation is different: small 
productive units predominate on the high plateau while in the east of the country most 
holdings are medium-sized and large. 
 
            According to the information available, most holdings are in the hands of their 
proprietors. However, in Chile the proportion of leased land is greater than in the 
other countries, and in Argentina and Uruguay a higher proportion of farmers are 
tenants, especially in the production of crops like soya beans. 
 
            As for land reform, in all these countries the institutional system is involved in 
the process of the allocation or distribution of land. Brazil seems to have the clearest 
policy in this respect, but the subject has become more important in all the countries’ 
sectorial policies. Brazil is the only member of the extended MERCOSUR to take 
positive steps in this direction and to be operating an active process of land 
redistribution. 
 
            In Annex 24 it can be seen that all the countries have policies to manage water 
and forestry. That is to say, they all have legislation in force governing the use of 
biofuels, with the exception of Chile which is in the process of implementing a policy 
of this kind. Argentina, Chile and Uruguay have animal welfare standards, and in 
Brazil the application of a policy of this type is currently under debate. 
 
            In Chile the main areas of agricultural public spending are, in order of the 
amounts involved, irrigation, productivity improvement and the development of 
capabilities, rural development, soil recovery, training and extension. Considerable 
resources are also devoted to social expenditure and fostering production. 
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            As to financial instruments, it can be seen in Annex 22 that Argentina makes 
use of the warrants systems for rice, oils, apples, olives, hides, oats and rice husks, 
and futures markets are in operation for soya beans, maize, sunflowers and wheat. 
Brazil also makes use of the warrants system and other credit instruments for sugar, 
cotton, sugarcane rum and alcohol. Chile has developed agricultural insurance for 
maize, wheat, wine in bulk, rice and raps.  
 
            All the MERCOSUR countries have implemented policies aimed at improving 
producers’ competitiveness so as to promote favourable insertion in world markets. 
For this reason technology policies implemented by government institutions follow 
this path, but the countries in the region are still allocating insufficient investment to 
research and development. 
 
            Chile allocates relatively high amounts to this kind of policy, 1.02% of 
agricultural GDP, followed by Bolivia, Brazil and Argentina. Uruguay is the country 
with the lowest relative rate of investment in agricultural research and development: 
only 0.4% of sectorial GDP. 
 
           Investments in R&D have enabled some countries to develop new varieties of 
high productivity plants adapted to local conditions, such as enhanced soya beans in 
Brazil, biotechnology programmes to improve soya, oilseed and some cereals in 
Argentina, improved competitiveness in the production of quality beef in Uruguay, 
and developments in wine in Chile. 
 
 
4.3.4. EU export subsidies and domestic assistance for some  
export products important for MERCOSUR countries 
 
The following are some examples of EU support mechanisms for some products that 
loom large in MERCOSUR agricultural exports, such as rice, dairy products, cereals 
and oilseed. 
 
a) Rice 
 
            Current direct assistance for this product increased from 52 euros/ton to 177 
euros/ton (converted into assistance according to area, taking into account national 
yield coefficients). Of this, 102 euros/ton will be part of the Single Payment Scheme 
and will be paid in accordance with traditional rights, within the present limit of 
guaranteed maximum area. Likewise, the intervention price mechanism is maintained 
but with a 50% reduction, and stands at 150 euros/ton. Intervention is applicable to 
75,000 tons per annum. 
 
           The CAP reform established a number of conditions for this kind of assistance. 
For instance, to qualify for the Single Payment Scheme it is necessary to comply with 
standards for environmental protection, food safety, animal and vegetable health and 
animal welfare. In addition to this, there is a requirement that agricultural land be kept 
in good agronomic and environmental condition.  Along the same lines, there are 
modulation conditions (reductions in direct payments in order not to go over budget), 
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agricultural audits and possible sanctions when established limits for areas or 
maximum quantities are exceeded.  
 
            In the case of rice, there are also requirements about sowing deadlines, 
varieties, crop mix, payment terms, etc. The European Union grants the rice sector 
average annual assistance to the tune of 406 million euros, although during the last 
three commercialisation campaigns the sum for global measures increased steadily. 
 
            In addition, assistance is granted through exempt direct payments 
(compensatory payments per hectare for rice producers) of around 110 million euros 
per annum. 
 
CHART 19 
EU: DOMESTIC ASSISTANCE AND SUBSIDIES FOR RICE 
Commercialisation 
campaign 
Export subsidies 
(million euros) Internal assistance (million euros) 
2001-2002 30.3 112.8  (compensatory payment per HA*) 396.5  (GAM) 
2002-2003 24.9 117.5   (compensatory payment per HA*) 405.6  (GAM) 
2003-2004 No data 110.1  (compensatory payment per HA*) 420.7  (GAM) 
Source: European Union notification to the WTO. 
GAM: Global Assistance Measures: All assistance granted to specific products and assistance not earmarked for 
specific products that is not only subject to commitments to reduction but whose level has been established at the 
WTO. Thus assistance in excess of a given notified sum for each country is not allowed. A typical example of this 
kind of measure is that of maintaining price levels. 
Exempt Direct Payments: Payments made in the framework of production-limiting programmes. Such payments 
are linked to a specific number of head of cattle. 
 
            The rice sector receives average export subsidies from the European Union 
amounting to about 25 million euros per annum. This distorts these firms’ 
competitiveness and rebounds to the detriment of MERCOSUR rice exporting 
countries such as Uruguay. 
 
b) Dairy Products 
 
            According to notifications to the WTO, the EU granted a total of 6,884.7 
million Euros to the dairy product sector in 2003-2004, which is the latest period for 
which the WTO has received notification. The specific products that benefited include 
powdered skimmed milk, butter and milk. These assistance payments were classified 
as amber box internal assistance by specific product.  
 
            Of the above sum, only assistance that went to powdered skimmed milk and 
butter was included in the Global Assistance Measure (GAM). Assistance provided 
for milk was not included because it is a considered de minimis. In other words, if the 
outlay is less than 5% of the value of the total production of milk it can be 
disregarded, and thus it is possible to remain within the limits of outlay allowed.  In 
the EU, this is the sector receiving the greatest domestic assistance payment. 
 
           Assistance for powdered skimmed milk and butter was granted to keep prices 
up, while assistance for milk was granted directly to support production in Finland. 
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            Besides amber box assistance measures, the EU also grants assistance of the 
green box type, i.e. the kind of assistance that will not distort trade or do so only 
minimally, and which is allowed without limits to outlay. The green box assistance 
that the EU grants the dairy sector lies comes in the class considered as ‘domestic 
food assistance’, that is to say, assistance provided for the most needy sector of the 
population, and it takes the form of directly supplying food products to beneficiaries, 
providing beneficiaries with the means to buy food products at market prices, or 
subsidising prices. 
 
            The EU also grants a considerable number of export subsidies, mainly for 
cheese and powdered skimmed milk. In 2002-2003, the last period for which the 
WTO has been notified about export subsidies, the EU granted a total 1,027 million 
euros for dairy products, of which 26% was earmarked for cheese (267.7 million 
euros), 16% for powdered skimmed milk and 58% for other dairy products. In 
addition to this, the EU has reported that in 2002-2003, food assistance consisting of 
dairy products amounted to a total of 1,200 tons. 
 
c) Cereals 
 
            In 2001-2002, subsidies granted by the EU to the cereal sector amounted to 
112.8 million euros for the production of 3,922.4 million metric tons (the harvest 
qualifying for this subsidy started on 1 July, 2001). In addition to this, the EU 
provided food assistance in cereals amounting to 58.2 million metric tons. 
 
            For 2002-2003 (the latest period reported to the WTO) total expenditure on 
export subsidies amounted to 167 million euros, which means that a total of 6,259.3 
thousand metric tons was subsidised. The EU also granted 86.5 thousand metric tons 
of cereals in food assistance.    
 
            In addition to this, according to European Union notifications to the WTO, in 
2003-2004 (the last period covered), domestic assistance to maintain price levels was 
granted to barley producers (1,859.8 million euros), rye producers (243.2 million 
euros) and sorghum producers (8.8 million euros). This assistance was classified as 
amber box domestic assistance for specific products. The EU reported negative 
assistance for oats of -89.2 euros.  
 
            The European Union also granted blue box domestic assistance to secondary 
cereals by means of direct payments in the framework of programmes limiting 
production. These measures are exempt from reduction commitments as they are 
based on areas and fixed yields rather than on volume of production. 
 
d) Oleaginous products and vegetable oils 
 
            With the 2003 CAP reforms, payments connected to production in the olive oil 
sector became direct income assistance. Thus 60% of payments linked to production 
were turned into new rights under the Single Payment Scheme for exploitation. 
 
            As is the case for other EU sectors, this new kind of assistance for producers 
in the sector depends on compliance with environmental and food safety standards, 
through the policy of ecological conditioning. 
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           The EU has still not notified the WTO about levels of assistance for the seed 
and oil sector after the CAP reforms. However, the amounts of domestic assistance 
awarded to the olive oil sector for 2001/2002 to 2003/2004 are available. During the 
2001/2002 period, assistance amounting to a total of 2,070 million euros was provided 
for the purpose of maintaining price levels, and in the 2002/2003 and 2003/2004 
campaigns assistance amounted to 2,122 and 2,649 million euros respectively. This 
too was for programmes aimed at maintaining prices.  
  
e) Some comparative observations about EU assistance and subsidies for 
specific products important for MERCOSUR. 
 
            The above outline sums up a very important question in the bilateral 
negotiations and is the reason for continued rejection on the part of agricultural 
producers in the extended MERCOSUR. These producers would have to compete 
with European agricultural producers under asymmetrical conditions in the framework 
of a bilateral free trade agreement and also in international markets, and this would 
even affect MERCOSUR’s own domestic markets. This is because still today (albeit 
to a far lesser extent than previously due to the policy of ‘decoupling’), European 
agricultural subsidies and assistance make European producers artificially more 
competitive than the unsubsidised agriculture in the MERCOSUR countries, which, to 
make matters worse, is even liable for export taxes. 
  
            It is not feasible to solve the question of internal assistance in bilateral 
negotiations. A solution will depend on the international environment at the WTO. 
Even export subsidies will require sophisticated mechanisms if they are to have any 
real effect in the framework of a bilateral agreement while preventing the 
triangulation of prices. However, the fact is that the question of domestic assistance 
and export subsidies is a factor in the negotiating climate, and may hamper progress. 
This suggests that it would be advantageous to search for flexible formulae to enable 
the EU to grant some concessions in order to somehow compensate for the 
disadvantages that MERCOSUR agriculture is burdened with. 
 
 
 
5. EU-MERCOSUR NEGOTIATING PROPOSAL 
2004 
 
5.1. Tariff Reduction 
 
 
a) European Proposal 
 
            In 2004 the European Union submitted a proposal for the reduction of tariffs 
on MERCOSUR agricultural exports. This involves five categories of reduction, 
which depend on how sensitive different products are for European producers. 
 
1. Category A:  Less sensitive products. For these the EU proposes the 
complete elimination of tariffs when the bilateral agreement is signed. 
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Seventy percent of European imports from MERCOSUR come in this 
category. Note that that 50% percent of these imports already enjoy free 
access to the European market. 
 
2. Category B:   Products for which the EU proposes to completely 
eliminate tariffs four years after the bilateral agreement is signed. 
 
3. Category C:   Products for which the EU proposes to completely 
eliminate tariffs seven years after the bilateral agreement is signed. 
 
4. Category D:   Products for which the EU proposes to completely 
eliminate tariffs ten years after the bilateral agreement is signed. 
 
5. Category E:   Highly sensitive products for which the EU does not 
propose any reduction in tariffs whatsoever. This category includes meat, 
sugar, wine, some fruit and vegetables, and the volumes involved amount 
to a very small percentage of current MERCOSUR exports to Europe 
because the access conditions for these products entering the European 
market are so adverse. Naturally, this small percentage is out of all 
proportion to these products’ great export potential. 
  
 
CHART 20 
EU: PROPOSAL FOR TARIFF REDUCTIONS  
ACCORDING TO PRODUCT CATEGORY 
Year after signing  
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Number 
of tariff 
lines 
Percentage 
of tariff lines 
Average 
tariff 
applied 
Percentage 
of exports 
to EU 
Category A 100           4323 41.5 1.4 69.9 
Category B 20 40 60 80 100       2182 20.9 4.5 6.7 
Category C 12.5 25 37.5 50 62.5 75 88 100    2664 25.5 8.4 12.4 
Category D 9 18 27 36 45 54 63 72 81 90 100 429 4.1 17 5 
Category E 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 532 5.1 15.1 3.1 
Source: European Commission. 
 
 
b) The MERCOSUR Proposal 
 
            The first MERCOSUR offer covers 32.6% of MERCOSUR imports from the 
EU, and a notable feature of the offer is that MERCOSUR has announced its intention 
to reach a 100% reduction in taxes on trade and maintain ad valorem tariffs as its only 
tariff protection. In this proposal, MERCOSUR has excluded 68% of trade. 
 
            In the analysis of this offer the same categories for tax reduction as in the EU 
proposal are used. 
 
CHART 21 
THE MERCOSUR TARIFF OFFER TO THE EU: 
MERCOSUR IMPORTS FROM THE EU – 1996-2000 AVERAGE 
(million US dollars) 
 59
 A B C D E TOT 
Agriculture and fisheries 43 0.2% 17 0.1% 116 0.5% 5 0.0% 11 0.0% 193 
Foodstuffs industry 0 0.0% 1 0.0% 37 0.2% 41 0.2% 13 0.1% 91 
Minerals and fuels 176 0.8% 0 0.0% 7 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 182 
Chemicals, pharma., plastics 195 0.8% 997 4.3% 150 0.7% 552 2.4% 55 0.2% 1949 
Paper, publications 57 0.2% 0 0.0% 1 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 58 
Stone, cement, ceramics, glass 0 0.0% 7 0.0% 26 0.1% 29 0.1% 12 0.1% 73 
Metal and manufactures 5 0.0% 0 0.0% 3 0.0% 65 0.3% 6 0.0% 79 
Machines, electric equipment 536 2.3% 80 0.3% 190 0.8% 2534 11.0% 37 0.2% 3376 
Tractors, aircraft, ships 745 3.2% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 38 0.2% 0 0.0% 783 
Optical, photographic, surgical 
medical instruments and 
equipment, and furniture 
143 0.6% 8 0.0% 13 0.1% 318 1.4% 50 0.2% 533 
TOTAL OFFER 1900  1110  542  3580  166  7319 
Share in EU imports 8%  5%  2%  16%  1%  32% 
Source: European Economic Commission. 
 
 
5.2. Tariff Quotas 
 
a) European Proposal 
 
            The 2004 European 2004 proposal for tariff quotas covers all the sensitive 
agricultural products in the negotiations, namely meat (beef, pork, chicken), cereals 
(maize and wheat), dairy products (powdered milk, butter, cheese) and ethanol. It 
distinguishes two different steps: a first group of quotas granted when the bilateral 
agreement is signed, and additional tariff quotas after the WTO multilateral agreement 
stemming from the Doha Round has been signed, as a part of the erga omnes quota 
open to all countries earmarked for MERCOSUR.  
 
CHART 22 
EU: QUOTAS PROPOSED IN MERCOSUR-EU ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION 
AGREEMENT (EAA) NEGOTIATIONS 
(metric tons) 2004 
Products Direct quotas"First step" 
Additional quotas 
resulting from Doha 
Round 
"Second step" 
TOTAL 
quota 
Beef 60,000 40,000 100,000 
Pork 6,000 5,000 11,000 
Chicken 45,000 30,000 75,000 
Maize 400,000 300,000 700,000 
Low quality wheat  120,000 80,000 200,000 
Ethanol 600,000 400,000 1,000,000 
Milk and powdered milk  6,500 6,500 13,000 
Cheese 10,000 10,000 20,000 
Source: European Economic Commission 
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
It is not possible to make a true comparative analysis of EU and MERCOSUR 
agricultural policies without taking the global context of the two blocs’ trade relations 
into account. 
 
            In economic terms, there is clear asymmetry between the two regions. EU-25, 
with just under twice the population of MERCOSUR, generates a GDP that is 9.3 
times greater, and its exports are seven times greater than the extended 
MERCOSUR’s. This disparity goes some way towards explaining why EU-25 per 
capita GDP is five times greater than the extended MERCOSUR’s. 
 
            This asymmetry does not prevent there being strong links between the two 
blocs. Europe is one of the main investors in the extended MERCOSUR, particularly 
in Brazil, Bolivia and Chile, where EU investments account for more than one third of 
total foreign investment. Thus, an Association Agreement between the two regions 
would not only improve conditions for European investors, it would also lead 
indirectly to increased flows of trade between the EU and MERCOSUR thanks to the 
greater legal security that the agreement would provide, and this would be reflected in 
more profits for European enterprises located in MERCOSUR countries. Besides this, 
MERCOSUR agricultural exports account for more than 20% of Europe’s total 
agricultural imports. Agricultural products occupy a strategically important position 
between the two blocs because the global balance of trade, which is very much in 
MERCOSUR’s favour, would be negative for the southern bloc if these products were 
not taken into account. 
 
            It should be noted that despite the strong links between the two blocs they do 
not give preferential trade treatment to each other except for GSP Plus, whereby 
Bolivia enjoys trade advantages in the EU, and the Economic Association Agreement 
between Chile and the European Union.  
 
            The agricultural policies of the European Union and MERCOSUR are clearly 
divergent. 
 
             In the first place, their objectives are different. Whereas, despite CAP reform, 
the main European objective is still to defend agriculture in the EU countries, the 
MERCOSUR countries have focused their policies on improving competitiveness in 
order to penetrate international markets, and in recent years they have placed greater 
emphasis on rural development policies to support marginal and small agricultural 
producers.   
 
            The two blocs can also be differentiated by their instruments they employ. 
 
• The Southern Cone countries have liberalised their economies and have 
drastically cut support of agriculture, while the emphasis in the EU policy, in 
contrast, is on mechanisms for generalised direct assistance. 
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• When it comes to access to markets, the EU, unlike MERCOSUR, makes use 
of all available instruments for protection such as tariff peaks, tariff escalation 
and quotas. The European Union applies these kinds of instruments far more 
than does MERCOSUR, particularly for products that loom large in 
MERCOSUR exports. 
 
• European export subsidies were high in the 1990s but were reduced sharply in 
the latest CAP reforms. Previously they were geared more to meat and cereals 
but now their greatest impact is on sugar and dairy products. In 2005 the latter 
two items accounted for 70% of total export subsidies. European subsidies 
have been cut considerably but they are still high in comparison to those of the 
MERCOSUR countries, and this difference is further exacerbated by the fact 
that MERCOSUR agriculture does not just lack subsidies but is burdened with 
export taxes.  
 
Bearing these context-related elements in mind, we can easily identify two key 
points in future bilateral EU-MERCOSUR negotiations: 
 
            MERCOSUR is clearly on the offensive in the sphere of agriculture, and the 
EU position is merely defensive. Europe’s generalised support for agriculture gives 
European producers an artificial advantage over MERCOSUR producers in 
international markets since the latter have nowhere near the same levels of support 
and are heavily taxed. 
 
            Access to European markets is of vital importance to MERCOSUR, but today 
access to these markets is restricted by high barriers against imports, and the only 
flexibility in this scenario is provided by limited tariff quotas in the framework of 
managed trade. 
 
            Agricultural negotiation cannot be analysed independently of the framework 
of global negotiations, which also include manufactured goods and services. It is 
obvious that the European Union will not substantially improve its 2004 agricultural 
offer unless MERCOSUR reciprocates with concessions in the areas of manufactured 
goods and services.  
 
          The complexity of EU-MERCOSUR trade negotiations goes far beyond the 
bilateral relationship between the two blocs. It is not feasible to tackle the question of 
domestic support just on the bilateral level; progress will depend on developments in 
the multilateral arena of the WTO. Similarly, the possibility of the MERCOSUR 
countries obtaining larger tariff quotas is closely linked to the multinational 
negotiations through which the EU grants erga omnes quotas that are open to all 
countries on a competitive basis. The question is whether the quotas granted by the 
EU to MERCOSUR are to be a part of the global erga omnes quotas that have already 
been established or are on the agenda at the WTO, or whether they are to be additional 
to these.  
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